Sounds + Food 'n' Retail

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According to Distrifood.nl (Dutch) the " man's cola" showed a nice profit this last year, making it the top new introduction to a brand in 2007.


(Source picture: Elsevier.nl (Dutch))

I only point this out, since Coke Zero is one of the first food-related topics I wrote about on Tech IT Easy; a, fairly clear, signal that it was time to "spin-off" to this blog.

An interesting quote from the Economist this week. Particularly, because I personally suffer from it, and imagine a lot of other people & businesses do too.

Mr. Fellows [CEO of Callaway golfing equipment] believes that the "fundamental principles of running a company don't change just because the product category is different." In his view, Callaway's problems stemmed from the fact that it saw itself as a golf business, not as a consumer-goods company. He resolved to focus on "what the consumer wants, not our own feelings about what the game of golf should be."

It doesn't matter if you're the CEO of a company, an investor, a sales-person, a blogger, etc., I think everyone has an idea of what they want and what customers should want. But what it really comes down to is the latter.

Face Value, my favourite section in the Economist, every week.

The picture is courtesy of digitalfreak.net

Hey, a little busy at the moment, but here's some links, I've enjoyed recently.

• Jim Donald's, former Starbucks' CEO, month by Patricia Sellers (Fortune): After listening to an interview with Frank Addante on Venture Voice, where he said "Time is a finite asset!", I looked up "time-management CEO" on Google, and this is the first thing I found. Some good tips on meetings, getting up at 6, and generally managing your time.


• Monocle design-notes by Dan Hill: I printed this 32-page (!) document out this morning, and it will probably take me a few days to digest it, but I'm already enjoying the first few pages, where he writes about the vision behind Monocle as a mag. and as an internet-publication and how the multi-disciplinary team reflected this.


• 10 Ways to Improve Your Programming Productivity by Matt Moore: I love productivity-stuff, and think most of these tips apply to any activity really.


• The 7th Deadly Claim — “Best Value” by Jeff Sexton (Future Now): "The problem for most companies is that they don’t do BOTH well: Either they don’t do enough to persuade customers of the product’s value, or they price their high-quality item even higher than what they’ve been able to substantiate to the market."


• How Facebook Is Like Ikea by Tim Harford (Slate): Considering I wrote about something related a few months ago…

The picture is courtesy of shoutwire.com

Normally, you would say that alcohol & money don't mix. But in the world of beer, at least in the Netherlands, there is tangled web that has been woven between financiers and the horeca-industry, which is difficult to unwind, and, some people argue, shouldn't be unwound.

First of all, what is investing all about?
It's all about profit, obviously, but it's also about minimising the risk for investors. Two big risks facing investors are informational.

One the one hand, there's moral hazard—the risk that entrepreneurs take their new assets (money) and misuse it in some way; On the other hand, there's adverse selection—the risk that entrepreneurs are not as capable as they claim to be.

Either of these situations requires a different response and a different type of investor. For moral hazard, the typical response is for investors to mingle in the affairs of their investee's operations and strategy and take equity; the so-called active investor, which includes business angels and venture capitalists.

For adverse selection, the typical response is to restrict the entrepreneurs movement through collateral, restrictive, covenants, and and short maturities, to minimise risk-engaging behaviour. This is the realm of the passive investor, which includes banks.

Financial beer-tactics
When looking at these two investors, you see some differences; Active investors take equity—become part owner of the firm—and they do this because they can't do much else to influence the use of their money. Passive investors prefer to use measures like lend against collateral, e.g. real estate or other tangible assets, which they can claim if the investment were to go wrong.

In the case of horeca-owners, you typically do have some kind of physical asset. You occupy a venue, you have machinery, and inventory. This is much more the realm for passive investors, who can relatively safely lend some money against the existing collateral.

There is one complication, however; Horeca is typically known for high failure-rates. I'm not sure why this is so. I guess that the leisure industry is largely sensitive to seasonal differences and economic downturns. And perhaps, the barriers to entry are low; there could be a lot of low-skilled entrepreneurs out there, who are not as capable of running & growing a business as they think. And finally, growth in itself could be a problem, if the capital requirements are significant.

The way investors get around it in the Netherlands is actually not to invest. Instead, they leave it up to breweries, who, against a right of exclusivity, lend a certain sum to the business, or give it a discount, and provided it with the necessary materials, branded of course.

What's the problem?
From my angle, there isn't one really. If horeca is such a risky business, and other investors are unwilling to invest, then I don't think an entrepreneur should complain about a simple exclusivity-contract. And particularly so, because of three factors.

For one, exclusivity is only valid if the brewery has less than 30% market-share. In the case of someone like Heineken, who also owns a number of other beer-brands, and has more than 30% market-share, you can quit such a contract after two months. Then again, Heineken does its best to provide other value-added services to make sure that this doesn't happen.

And second, there's a lot of consolidation in the alcohol-business. And just because a company has a certain exclusivity, it may have such a large portfolio of brands that there isn't any shortage of choice for customers; neither do I think these exclusivity-contracts are 100% bullet-proof.

The third factor seems to be a problem. By not giving customers a choice, they have learned not to care about brand so much when they enter a pub. They just ask for a beer. So for them, unless they're a beer-fanatic, it doesn't matter much. For producers, on the other hand, their brand has become a commodity, at least where nightlife is concerned.

Who cares, right?
Heineken seems to care, and is all for the liberalisation of Dutch pubs. Ignoring that a. this would disrupt a pretty good funding situation for Dutch pubs, and b. that Heineken owns more than 30% of the beer-market, making their exclusivity-deals vulnerable anyway, I do kind of see their point.

By turning a brand into a commodity, you take away marketing-potential. If you can position your beer-brand above that of regular beer, then you can reap higher profits. That makes 100% sense to me, from the brewery's perspective.

And, from what I understand, British pubs don't actually have such exclusive deals with breweries. The question is then, how they get funded, or whether the failure rate is perhaps lower in the UK? That, for now, is a question unanswered to me, but I'll do my best to find out.

(You can always give it to me in the comments.)

Part of this topic was inspired by a good article (unfortunately not online) in Dutch Marketing Tribune, still my favourite Dutch mag.

When I started this blog, and my general thoughts about the area of food & retail, it was all about the people. A quality staff and happy customers, what more do you want? And I have to say, from past experiences, that I don't really like businesses that don't place people first.

For instance, one individual I worked with, suggested using handicapped people to put together a product manually. I instantly disliked him. Not that I don't want handicapped people to be productive, but it was the thought behind it; to find a "stupid" workforce, which you can save tons of money on. It was just distasteful.

Another company I worked for was very process-orientated.
There's nothing wrong with that of course, but it was a big company with a reputation for innovation and that is why I joined. And you expect such a company to at least push forward a solid project. Well, as it turned out, the organisation's core-strategy was to start a large number of risky projects and have them compete with each-other. Those that would fail would simply be abandoned, and their staff was expected to fall on their swords… metaphorically. The effect was an incredibly high turn-over of employees, all three projects I worked on no longer exist, and it deeply soured my feelings about this company.

Both these examples, to me, represent a lack of respect for the human element. I realise that business is a hard world, but if projects were designed to be solid in the first place, there would be less of a need for these kinds of practices. Just my 2 cents.

Part 2 - the challenges that people businesses face
HBR (Again! I'm sorry, but I read a lot of HBR-articles!) published an article about people businesses some time ago, which I enjoyed. Following are some notes + thoughts about it.

• People businesses are defined as: "operations which are characterised by 1. high overal employee costs, 2. a high ratio of employee costs to capital costs, and 3. limited spending on activities, such as R&D, aimed at generating future revenue."


• In a top-40 list of people-businesses, published in that same article, only a few qualify as food and/or retail related. These are the Hospital Corporation of America, Tenet Healthcare, Marriott hotels, and Accor hotels.


• For instance, a business like McDonalds does not classify as a people business; it has substantial assets in terms of brand & real-estate, and relatively low people-cost.


• People-businesses face a number of challenges, related to performance measurement, people-management, compensation, and business models.


• Measuring productivity is more important in these businesses, then other economic performance indicators, like return on assets or investment. The challenge is finding the right indicators (employee productivity & profitability), as well as benchmarking it against other companies (employee figures do not always need to be made public).


• To manage people, you need to align employees' interests with business objectives & execution. And you need to find ways to measure performance (see above) continuously and see where your weak spots are.


• Compensation is key, as productivity is very sensitive to it, and is a primary determinant of shareholder risks & returns. Other factors to consider are variability—productivity varies across the workforce and how do you get the most out of a diverse workforce—and reach—sometimes the lowest on the ladder are as, if not more important to a firm's performance, and how do you motivate these people to do their jobs as good as possible?


• There are a number of business models are used in these types of businesses: pricing per hour is a safe method, but does not account for extra performance; a fixed price per output allows companies to shave costs off the inputs and thus increase their profit-margins. It is very susceptible to a high-skilled workforce; a success-fee or commission offers the best returns, but also the greatest risks; some companies use a hybrid of these three.


• The strategic weakness with these types of businesses is that your assets are mobile and can walk out the door. By creating value above and beyond your employees, you can diversify some of that risk away. Of course, you could also try to keep your employees ;).

In other words, I am no longer sure if e.g. a retailer qualifies as a people-business. Looking at other large chains however—Starbucks, Ahold, Ikea—you see that considerable expenditure is geared towards training these people and the secondary conditions—healthcare, etc.—are extensive. But, I guess it depends on the ratio of physical assets & brand vs. employee-value. If the first two far outweigh the second, I guess that makes the difference.

I guess it's up to individual businesses how they want to measure their firm's performance. The most straightforward is certainly return on assets or investment. But even that leads to some question-marks, particularly in today's highly software-based economy, where assets are no longer as necessary, or pricey, as they once were.

For my part, I still think that people are a key-asset to a business, and it's interesting to look at how exactly you motivate a workforce and get the most out of them, as well as how to overcome the challenges related to a people-based business.

Equally interesting is how to align the business-model to match the needs of your assets—the people. Since people are motivated by (financial & non-financial) compensation, do you keep the pay-rate aligned with time-spent; fixed; aligned with performance; or a hybrid of the three? I think the hybrid is always the best choice, but even then some combinations work better than others.

And retaining employees is also an interesting problem; though much less so in countries like France, where getting rid of them is a problem, and differently in places like Silicon Valley, where inter-firm mobility is a key-requirement for many employees. I think the solution is completely personal and cultural, and everybody's answer will be different on this.

The picture is courtesy of prairienet.org

I am not a born bootstrapper, let me make that clear from the start. I just like titles that include words starting with the same letter (is there a term for that?).

Bootstrapping is, in my own definition, "the ability to generate growth on minimal financial resources." I was first going to call it "the ability to survive on minimal resources," however that would make most of the third world bootstrapping-geniuses.

No, it's when entrepreneurs have an idea that they want to grow into a commercial business, and since finding funding is difficult and less preferable for some, they do so with minimal financial means, perhaps while maintaining another source of income and by generating organic growth—revenues derived from within the company. In sociology, there is a concept called bricolage, which means more or less the same.

What makes a born bootstrapper, or rather a good one? I think it requires three qualities:

• The first is certainly the ability to live cheaply, and I'll refer you to one of Jeremy's post where he makes the point quite eloquently. The ability to live without luxury, eating at discounters, buying second-hand furniture (or dragging it off the street), living in cheaper areas, and, most importantly, to delay paying the bills, are certainly key-components here. As is, making resource-choices for your business. Easy to do when you work in software, less so in physical businesses, though inventory is fun to play around with.


• The second quality is time-management. You need to generate growth within your company and pay the rent, so you have to make choices. You have to find alternative revenue-streams, perhaps get another job, and work on your business during your free time. It requires you to set some clear priorities, skip the weekly cinema-visit or the time spent with your loved ones.


• The third and final quality, is to be goal-orientated. You could place that under time-management, perhaps, but where bootstrapping is most likely to fail is when motivation drops. You need to keep your eye on the ball at all times; the priority for a bootstrapper is to grow the business, not keep a stable job, and you need to see the light at the end of a tunnel and keep going until you reach it.

Anything I missed?

The picture is courtesy of rockies-ice.com

Ten tips, taken from an essay written by Masterson, entitled "The Winner's Rule", from the book "Just One Thing

Advice is a funny thing. I don't think it's advice at all; rather it's a set of criteria or truths, and fairly shallow ones at that. They ignore the context a person, a reader, a student, a business goes through. And what if we all met these same criteria? Wouldn't the world be a much more boring place? As such, treat all "advice" with care.

I can classify Masterson's points into two categories: Business-related & person-related.

Business-related
1. It's not a business until you make the first sale.

2. The most effective way to enter a new market, is to offer a popular product at a drastically reduced price.

3. Sell, sell, sell: keep on increasing the perceived value, allowing you to ramp up the price, and increase profit margins.

All of these are sort of straight-forward, I think, though certain terms should be qualified. For instance, what does a 'sale' mean? It's easy to understand it within the context of a product going over the counter, but what about service-companies or the many web-businesses that fund themselves through advertising (if that)? I would nominate the first "rule" to be: It's not a business until you make money.

The second and third points, to me, seem like a typical VC-thing to say. Scale, scale, scale. Sell cheap and sell much. And worry about increasing the profit-margins later on. Again, it should be qualified, depending on the type of business. For instance, the internet is a market-place for countless cheap (or free) and mass-products; but as a result many products/services have become simple commodities, with no one willing to pay for them, and businesses having to look towards advertising as a funding-source (shudder).

Personality-related
4. When choosing a business, pick the one that can be grown without your personal involvement.

5. Before investing, know exactly how much you're willing to lose, and get out before you hit that point.

6. First, improve your strengths. Then, eliminate your weaknesses.

7. Focussing is more effective, than a diversified approach.

8. Let your winners run, and cut your losers off… quickly.

9. 80% of success comes from 20% of your resources.

10. Try to always focus on the good of the whole, vs. the good of the one (applies to any relationship).

Lot's more to say here.

Completely agreed with point four, as entrepreneurship should not be about enslaving yourself to another organisation, at least not for life. Many entrepreneurs seem to ignore that rule, however. Also, VCs often prefer to replace the founders with more qualified executives to "grow the pie."

Point five is spoken like an investor and is very much dependant on the perception of risk you have. Entrepreneurs are reputed to be risk-taking people, however the smart entrepreneur takes a calculated risk, and understanding how much you're willing to lose is part of that.

Point six and seven are a personal weakness of mine, I'm too damn curious for my own good sometimes, more interested in exploring areas (of myself or in life) that are unknown to me, rather than that which is known. That may change, but is certainly not a criteria that I personally meet. I wrote about focus before, btw. Differs from person to person.

Point eight comes with experience, I think. On the one hand, you need to have perseverance, even when things are hard or going badly, especially during the early stages of a start-up. On the other hand, a reality-check is price-less. I suggest bouncing your ideas off as many people as possible.

Point nine is true, nothing to add.

Point ten is about understanding the core-principles of business and, even as an employee, doing all you can to make that business (instead of yourself) profitable. Ram Charan is a good man to read on that.

Good essay, made me think about my place in the world.

Read more entrepreneurship articles here.

Just a short tweet.

I'm currently reading a Dutch book on the 2003 crisis at Ahold, but which is actually a historical account of how the corporation came to be. A couple of things I found interesting:

• Ahold actually stands for AH (Albert Heijn) Holdings


• We all know that things are cyclical, but it was interesting to read how a recession and high oil prices were a challenge that Ahold had to face in the 60s-70s, and how they managed to survive.


• In order to inspire Dutch people to shop more, they introduced a financing scheme for fridges, which people couldn't afford at that time. General Motors did a similar thing to help people afford their cars; seems like an interesting way to "upgrade" an economy.


• The fear of a socialist government drove Albert Heijn to look outwards and form Ahold (similar to why IKEA decided to globalise also).


• One of the consequences of politics at that time was the board of directors, meant to provide impartial guidance and represent the workers.


• They made extensive use of consultancies (often McKinsey) whenever they decided on a strategic trajectory.


• One of the directors was a big fan of Harvard Business Review :)


• They use the US as a source of knowledge on how to design their supermarkets. Later on, moving to the US was also seen as a way to increase that learning, as well as a new revenue-source.


• When AH moved to the US, they also brought their own ideas, like, eh, advertising (a terrible, terrible idea).

That's it for now! I'll go into greater detail at a later date.

I took this title from a report on the future of Dutch supermarkets (English pdf). It identifies a number challenges to come, one of which is "stomach share," which is apparently a big deal because of the following three factors:

• Population decline: which translates into less consumers buying food
• Increased longevity: and older people have a lower caloric intake
• Increased awareness of health-issues: which also translates to a lower caloric intake.

The market is shrinking, people are spending less of their income on food, which will have have consequences on the channel (supermarket), the sales concept, and the value chain. And it will affect those players negatively that cannot leverage these four factors for optimum positioning.



What the authors are seeing is that players from the bottom of the market (the discounters) are moving upwards, by broadening their assortment of goods, and players from the top of the market (luxury-stores) are moving downwards, by improving their prices. A number of underlying things are going on here: luxury-stores can become cheaper by improving the efficiency of their stores and sourcing cheaper brands. And discounters can increase their offering through their relationship with suppliers.

Following HBS-quote, from an article entitled "Finding success in the middle of the market", sheds some light how Tesco does it:

A company controls midfield by fielding a complete product line that includes backs and forwards. In its supermarkets, Tesco, the successful UK retailer, offers consumers three options—good, better and best—in most high turnover product categories. In addition, Tesco doesn't just sell groceries through one-size-fits-all supermarkets. Recognizing the need to shape as well as respond to an increasingly segmented market, Tesco reaches its consumers through at least seven different store formats, from convenient Tesco Express outlets at one end of the spectrum to full assortment hypermarkets at the other. But, within all its stores, Tesco implements the same merchandising principles: Better, Simpler, Cheaper.

Can you guess who the loser is yet? Well, according to both the report and much data on the net, the losers are the new, innovative concepts, that may offer certain values to consumers on an ethical or health level, but are not able to reap the same advantages as more established players are.

That is also the answer why so many organic companies are being bought up by fmcg-companies. There's an interesting overview here; but if you want to follow one in real-time, check out this Inc. magazine blog run by Honest Tea, which has recently given away 40% of their company to Coca-Cola.

Of course that is only part of the answer. Consumers are not just focussed on price. And, while consumer-awareness of the global situation and their own health is clearly growing, that's not the whole answer either. People's lives are becoming ever more complex and convenience is a big selling point these days.

It's those companies that can combine a high level of consumer-responsiveness, together with assortment and price, that will capture the hearts of consumers. But I guess what is out, is the solo single-product-serving player in the market, purely focussed on softer advantages like "ethics," and forgetting that consumers still(!) have limited disposable income for their food-expenses, as well a limited time to engage in these activities.

Yesterday, I read an HBR-article by Roger Martin, on his book "The opposable mind", the ability for people to think contradicting thoughts and act on them at the same time (this may sound familiar, if you've ever read 1984).

My first instinct was to throw it out. I didn't like that he used the first few paragraphs to discredit other thinkers on leadership; and I didn't find his proposed method for coming up with a business-model particularly compatible with the general idea of "chaos" that he was proposing (more on that later). I even wrote an impassioned article about it, but waited a day before publishing it (no April fools from me this year). None of my criticism was directed at his core-concept, btw., I do believe in the ability to think contradicting thoughts, and act on them also.

After a night of sleep, I came to the conclusion that Martin's article was effective. Because it required me to think the article had faulty qualities, while the core-idea was right. And that was the very idea of 'double think'! Then I started thinking, what other areas could you apply this to? Pick one!

• My perception of the internet is that it's indiscriminately linear—we forget things the day after they are published. So how could you make it less linear?
• The perception of food is that it doesn't do well in e-commerce—they perish and people value touch. So how can you sell food via the internet?
• My perception of restaurants is that it requires a genius cook, who is both expensive and hard to handle. So how can you start a restaurant without such an individual, or better yet, how can you start a restaurant with one?

Essentially, 'double think' translates into a belief that the impossible can be made possible; all it requires is faith and homework!

Martin's method for coming up a business-model looks like this:

In other words, you need to identify your core-customers, understand that their decision-process is not linear; understand the equally multi-dimensional architecture of your business, industry, and economy; and come out with a product/service that meets these opportunities.

Whether this is the best way to come up with an impossible idea, I'm not sure. But it seems like a logical thing to do after you come up with an idea and are looking to place it within a commercial context.

He uses one example throughout the article, that of Red Hat Linux, which, I completely agree, is one of the best examples to choose. It is free software, but it's a commercial success, which goes against conventional thinking, at least at that time. And instead of just acting as a commodity or becoming proprietary charge-ware, they decided to make a services-company out of it, and a market-leader at that. So how would you turn your open-source product into a commercial success? If that isn't 'double think', I don't know what is.

Marqt is a market for farmers, recently launched in Amsterdam by Quirijn Bolle en Meike Beeren (both ex-Ahold). Can't really sum it up much more than that.

It focusses on two opportunities: from the supply-side, many farmers want to sell their products, but are unable to because of the power-play from regular retailers and/or at relatively low profit-margins. Last year, when I briefly looked at the organic boom, I already thought that there is an opportunity here, for farmers to become retailers themselves.

This is made possible by the other part of this equation, an elevated demand by customers for natural and ethical produce, and, to a lesser degree, local produce.

Bolle and Beeren rightly identified an absence of identity in food-retailers, an absence of accountability for the product-decisions they make. But they also identified a need by consumers for quality-guarantees.

Because you have to wonder, how is Marqt different from the regular outdoor-market that exists in every city? Well, here's one difference, and I'll try to give an example. 'Tis the season of mangoes, and I'm hooked. I've been buying these babies at €1 a piece at my supermarket, but stumbled across some great deals at the local market: €2.50 for a box of 8! The only problem: about 6 of these were either unripe or overripe. And who do I complain to? One of the 100s of vendors on the market, whose name or brand I don't even remember?

From my understanding (I don't live in Amsterdam), Marqt-products are more expensive than those of local markets, about on par with regular supermarket-foods. They work with partners that are able to supply in greater numbers, offer a quality-guarantee, and, very interesting, train Marqt's staff to understand and explain how products work.

Their added value is that they can offer suppliers higher margins, and consumers a richer shopping-experience. And from what I hear, though I have no numbers, the store is doing reasonably well.

Two other interesting facets: Marqt houses individual suppliers' stores. So you have Store X for dairy, store Y for meat, and store Z for bread. Marqt provides the space, the staff, the marketing, and collects a percentage of the profits.

Also interesting: the store doesn't accept cash. It's progressive, I agree, but also great marketing-value, sure to raise an eyebrow or 1000. And it saves money on the back-end, though I hope they get rid of the €0.50 transaction-fee.

I think it's a great idea, and hope the store continues to do well. Gives me hope, both in terms of opportunities for retail-entrepreneurship, and entrepreneurship in the Netherlands in general, which (in my opinion) could use a boost.

The argument for mass-production is that it enables innovations to become cheaper and hence raises the general quality of life of consumers. The argument against mass-production is a more controversial one: that it destroys the unique quality of, let's call it, art.

Starbucks is a very good example of those principles. It brought a higher standard of coffee to the American masses, who, according to Howard Schultz's Starbucks biography, had long been oppressed by low-quality coffee from retailers and coffeeshops alike. At the same time, as the recent crisis at Starbucks illustrates, it has reached a saturation-point: it has brought Starbucks-outlets to every corner in the US, as well as spawned a whole army of competitors, and its brand has become diluted. It has become a commodity.

Back to their roots?
The re-enstatement of Howard Schultz as CEO is a signal, that the business has lost some of its original spirit and is in need of a guiding light. A letter that is rumoured (!) to be written by Schultz confirms that Starbucks will be focussing on re-introducing that original spirit, as hard as that will prove to be. There's only so much that you can change, after your company has reached a certain size. It would, at this point, be like saying that McDonalds is planning to become your corner-restaurant where everybody knows your name and favourite food.

The innovative angle
A friend of mine made me aware of a new coffee-brewing machine on the market, called Clover, which promises to deliver a higher quality coffee to consumers, though also at a higher price. According to Bruce Milletto, a retail consultant to the coffee industry, "a typical American café spends around $50,000 on equipment, about one-quarter of which goes on an espresso machine. At $11,000, a Clover costs the same again." Thus the investment-proposition is not an attractive one to the average cash-strapped café, who would have to spend that kind of money and charge an expected $6 per cup to recuperate that cost.

Following the rules of mass-production, Starbucks + Clover makes for a match made in heaven, and so it is: Starbucks has in fact acquired Coffee Equipment Company, the four-year-old Seattle-based maker of the Clover coffee brewing machine, for an undisclosed sum.

Considering that Starbucks has long been threatened by the commoditisation of coffee in the US, through the birth of literarily 1000s of new franchisers who, on the surface, provide the same value-proposal, though perhaps at a lower quality and price, it makes sense to acquire one piece of machinery that makes a bit of difference in the eyes of certain consumers. Considering the recent partnership with Apple, I believe that these consumers share a similar taste and price-insensitivity, and since that segment appears to be growing, I believe that Starbucks made the right call. They appeal to the type of customer that will pay $6 for a cup, and with their economies of scale, that price is sure to drop to a slightly more acceptable level of (I guess) ca. $5.

The cultural angle
There is another side to this. The USA is not the world, and while Starbucks has been thriving over there, the Europeans (I can't speak for other continents) have enjoyed a coffee-culture for quite some time. For people like my parents, who are respectively citizens from Southern- and Western-Europe, and avid café-visitors, they would not even consider going to the Starbucks in the centre of their German hometown, because there are plenty of alternatives with more atmosphere, more identity. To them, Starbucks is like a McDonalds, a franchise that in fact shares many cultural values—bringing a good to the masses—and does so by building ecosystems of services—from music-retail to the happy-meal—to deepen the (commercial) relationships with its customers.

Consciously and subconsciously, I'm a sympathiser of "unique" café-outlets. I like spending time in them, sometimes hours at a time, read my newspaper in peace, and enjoy a reasonably good coffee at slightly less than $2 a cup. I don't actually care about spending twice that for a coffee, but all the Starbucks's I've been too (exclusively in Germany and the UK, I must admit), have been so devoid of atmosphere that I don't really spend more than a few minutes there, 30 max. The only thing that does attract me about them and similar stores, is that I can grab a cup-to-go, mostly in the summer, and enjoy it out in the sun.

As a citizen of Europe, I think I am a fan of the heritage of the traditional café and don't really want it to go. If that makes me "backwards" or conservative, I am sorry. I want the chance to enjoy a Turkish coffee in Brussels, an Italian coffee in Cologne, or simply a Dutch one here in Rotterdam. I enjoy knowing the history of a pub that has existed for over a 100 years in Antwerp, and the same in Maastricht, or Amsterdam. I want there to be a diversity, and most important, I want that choice to be mine. I don't want there to be a cloned coffeeshop on every corner.

One of the saddest things I heard, while I was in Belgrade last year, was the exactly such a historical café was replaced by a chain (and the coffee stunk too); and I was equally sad to see that nearly all of the traditional retailers I remember from before the war had been replaced by a cloned shopping-centre that would've made any Western city proud: from H&M to Footlocker.

Opponent: Starbucks?
Globalisation is a situation we must all deal with. Its oldest proponents are the FMCG-companies, who are focussed on producing the same good for millions of people. The question is whether coffeeshops should embrace the FMCG-principles like McDonalds and Starbucks clearly have.

Starbucks is a formidable opponent: it is both a roaster, a retailer, and an FMCG-producer. It is strong in the US, and has a significant presence in the rest of the world. It will not go away, And not all believe that their presence is all that disruptive. I don't either, as long as Starbucks knows its limits. There are parts of the world that do not share the same qualities as US-towns. Some cities have long histories and places of heritage that should perhaps not be housing a McDonalds or Starbucks.

In a way cafés are stuck. They need the kind of innovation that Clover brings, but they are not in a position to buy their way in. If they did, they too would have to become mass-marketeers, in order to recuperate that cost. Instead they need to focus on what they do best, and coffee-machine makers to do the same and just license their technology. And whether the latter is able or willing to do that is the question.

I'm not sure how much Clover was acquired for, no one is. And I'm not sure how far Starbucks is willing to go to ensure their qualitative and quantitative dominance of the market. Will they grab every new piece of technology that promises to introduce a higher quality of coffee to consumers, keep it for themselves, and leave the traditional cafés to differentiate themselves simply by their "culture"? Sheer business-principles dictate that they will.

Howard Schultz made me believe, in his book, that it was Starbucks' mission to bring better coffee to the world. Let's hope that a richer coffee does not come at the price of a blander world.

This piece is in fact incomplete. Optimally I should write up a list of actions for coffeeshops to take. However, I am not yet that familiar with all the business-issues facing these organisations and all of my suggestions would be targeted at growing in size and battling on similar terms as a national or global player. And I'm pretty sure that many would not be willing to do that. So I think I'll wait until I have a more objective grasp—from all angles—on the situation, before giving practical advice. Feel free to provide me with that objectivity through your comments.

Just read an interview with Ford's ex-CEO Jacques Nasser on the training programs that were prevalent at that time (2000). He justified their need, by outlining the history of the car-industry between 1905 and now.

• 1905-1920s - colonisation of car-companies: smaller replicas of car-factories in the US were being built abroad. Hardly any competition.
• 1920s-1950s - nationalism: lots of countries were building their own national vehicles. Competition mostly on a regional level.
• 1960s-1980s - regionalism: the rise of trading-blocks (NAFTA, EU, etc.) and as a response the functional/regional division of companies.
• 1980+ - globalisation: global competitors, more markets, more divergence of consumers, more need for people/ideas/growth.

The situation at Ford
The result of the last period is that there are more Ford-people around the globe to manage, that more markets need to be served with different needs, and that the company that can generate economies of scale & scope, while being most consumer-orientated wins.

Two strategic priorities are at play here: consumers only see a part of the car, which means that the hidden qualities can be mass-produced; and consumers value those qualities most matched with their environment—e.g. in Brazil, so I read, roads are abysmal (if any Brazilian reads this, correct me), and good suspension is highly valued. In China, luxury models are mostly driven by chauffeurs, while the consumer sits in the back, hence he/she values luxury in that part of the car.

In this scenario, two types of qualities are valued with people: to understand the corporate qualities of Ford and make decisions that favour its mass-market strategies; and those that understand the local environment and can design car-offerings tailored to local needs.

Social operating mechanisms at Ford
Ford, at the time of the interview, had about 12 programs aimed at promoting these skills. The ones mentioned, included: Capstone, which is aimed at (24) executives; Executive partnering, aimed at (12) promising managers; Business leadership initiative, aimed at the whole organisation; and a weekly email-newsletter, called "Let's chat about business," also aimed at the whole organisation.

Methods + Aims were:

• Team-building - to get people to work more closely together / develop a corporate culture
• Teaching - to get people to understand the priorities at a corporate level, rather then just at a divisional/functional level
• Projects - to get people to come up with problems plaguing their organisations at that time and develop creative solutions to them.
• Shadowing - to develop leaders

Thoughts
Several thoughts going through my head at the moment. I am both uncertain how relevant this is to the SME-environment, and at the same time I do a lot of "social engineering" and can certainly think of a few cases in my past where a certain structure would have benefited the small teams I worked in. I'll probably write a third post about the SME-perspective at some point in the future.

My favourite way to picture "social engineering" however, is through designing processes that bring elements of the organisation together with customers and "raw-inputs" (new technologies, future employees, and partners, etc.). Maybe, I'll write about that at some point too.

Of course, I always appreciate the reader's perspective on this. Social programs at an SME-level, good for team-building or bad because it distracts from survival-priorities?

The picture is courtesy of articlescaravan.com