Sounds + Food 'n' Retail

Time for a wee break. In the last week, I've been researching Zara and H&M a little, to better understand the retail-sector and the fashion-segment. I'll probably have to do a follow-up to this post, as there is lots to say about both businesses, but here's some initial impressions, nevertheless.

First off, H&M appears a lot more clean in its approach. Judging by the annual reports alone, H&M not only has a 2007-edition (Zara is only up to 2006), but it is also only 85 pages long (presented in an eco-friendly 2-pages-per-side way), while for Zara, or actually Inditex, it's mother-company, the annual report is a stunning 450 page long!

Now, that's really not all that surprising, as Inditex is composed of a number of companies, and it is extremely vertically integrated, while H&M employs the Nike or Apple model—it designs and it retails, but it doesn't produce.

Why this is so, I can only guess, is due to their origins. Inditex comes from Spain, traditionally a low-waged country, while H&M is Swedish, not a low-waged country. Similar to IKEA, I imagine it was an economical decision to outsource most of its supplies.

It's very hard to separate Inditex from Zara, as both are founded and owned by the same person, Amancio Ortega Gaona, Spain's richest man. Zara has been in existence since 1975. H&M was founded by a Swede, Erling Person, in 1947, who ran the company to ca. the mid-90s, but which has continued to be a family firm.

Their business-philosophies are fairly similar, a low-cost, high-quality approach to fashion, as opposed to traditional brands, where quality most often equals price.

Zara made lots of headlines with its extremely high turnover of products—it produces around 11,000 items annually (as oppsed to 2,000-4,000 for other retailers); 15-20% produced before, 50-60% at the start of the season, and the rest during. If a product fails to do well, it is usually removed after a week in stores.

H&M made headlines with its celebrity-marketing, which is noteworthy, as Zara has virtually no marketing. Instead, because it has such a high turn-over of goods, customers tend to visit it more often, expecting new things—an average of 17 times per year vs. 3 times for other stores!

Both employ mostly a wholly-owned retail-strategy, except in countries where this is not possible. And both are very advanced in their use of IT to manage logistics and production, which is definitely seems to be a key-characteristic of delivering fashion quickly and find ways to decrease costs.

H&M's largest markets are Germany, Sweden, the USA, Spain, and the Netherlands (in terms of sales). For Zara it is Spain, France, Germany, and Mexico (in number of stores).

That's all I can think of in 30 mins or less…

I've included just the top-25 and annotated their focus. What's interesting, but not surprising, is that the majority of companies in that list are not independent horeca-orientated, apart from two: Hennie van der Most and Sjoerd Kooistra, both Dutch horeca-entrepreneurs.

The majority is hotel-chains, though the top-10 is quite diverse; a number of convenience-(fast)food places, resorts, as well as retailers. Interesting that both Ikea and Hema are on that list. Hema, as far as I know, has not been on the horeca-market for long (no revenue reported in 2006), but is already reaping significant successes. Probably my favourite retailer in the Netherlands, btw. Ikea, as I reported before, has been in the restaurant-business since 1971.



You can see the complete top-100 at Misset Horeca.

I'm thinking about adding another "interlude" to my collection, inspired by ADD without a doubt. It's the cookerlude, baby, aimed at collecting thoughts and notes on cooking in order not to forget and to better understand the world that a cook goes through. While I cook nearly every day, I don't consider myself a good cook. I simply don't have the taste-buds for it; but I do love the good food, which, luckily, my gut no longer shows!

I recently discovered a podcast, called/by The Restaurant Guys, which, apart from the insanely long commercials, actually seems quite interesting and is funny enough to keep my attention. Some notes.

Salt: So, we seem to have this internal taste-meter for the stuff, which in some ways is tied to the percentage of salt in salt-water. At the same time, our saliva actually dilutes salt in food, reducing it, meaning there should be a higher percentage in food than salt-water, for us to enjoy it.

Sugar: apparently there's no set limit for that, people love sugar (I must be the exception).

Salt + Sugar: whenever you make a sugary desert, adding a little(!) salt helps the taste; apparently they do funny stuff to each-other in your mouth, a party in your mouth, so to speak.

Taste-enhancers: apart from the above, olive oil, mushrooms, garlic, tomato-paste, alcohol (and much more) enhances the taste in your mouth.

Pretty basic, no? You can listen to the whole episode on what (American) people like in their food, here.

My own world
(This is where I talk a little about what I discovered myself in regard to cooking. Pretty basic too, so I'll try not to embarrass myself.)
I'm a big fan of salads, I make and eat one nearly every day as a meal. I often use canned tuna, but I recently discovered salmon in a can, which tastes better, is less salty, healthier, and costs about the same here in the Netherlands.

But steamed salmon is the best. You can get an expensive steamer, but a cheap solution is a microwave-steamer. I found one in a Chinese store for about €10, you can steam whatever you want in 5-10 mins and it magnifies the taste. Add some green beans and carrots, and you got a great salad for a meal! Add some potatoes or rice, and you won't need the salad.

Last, but not least, sometimes, not always,Ketchup actually makes for an interesting dressing (together with some oil and spices). It often contains vinegar, which salads like, and the tomato mixes well with the salmon-taste.

That's about it for today, I'm not sure how often I'll repeat these cookerludes, but I hope you enjoyed it! The picture is of course of Chef!, the show.

Normally, you would say that alcohol & money don't mix. But in the world of beer, at least in the Netherlands, there is tangled web that has been woven between financiers and the horeca-industry, which is difficult to unwind, and, some people argue, shouldn't be unwound.

First of all, what is investing all about?
It's all about profit, obviously, but it's also about minimising the risk for investors. Two big risks facing investors are informational.

One the one hand, there's moral hazard—the risk that entrepreneurs take their new assets (money) and misuse it in some way; On the other hand, there's adverse selection—the risk that entrepreneurs are not as capable as they claim to be.

Either of these situations requires a different response and a different type of investor. For moral hazard, the typical response is for investors to mingle in the affairs of their investee's operations and strategy and take equity; the so-called active investor, which includes business angels and venture capitalists.

For adverse selection, the typical response is to restrict the entrepreneurs movement through collateral, restrictive, covenants, and and short maturities, to minimise risk-engaging behaviour. This is the realm of the passive investor, which includes banks.

Financial beer-tactics
When looking at these two investors, you see some differences; Active investors take equity—become part owner of the firm—and they do this because they can't do much else to influence the use of their money. Passive investors prefer to use measures like lend against collateral, e.g. real estate or other tangible assets, which they can claim if the investment were to go wrong.

In the case of horeca-owners, you typically do have some kind of physical asset. You occupy a venue, you have machinery, and inventory. This is much more the realm for passive investors, who can relatively safely lend some money against the existing collateral.

There is one complication, however; Horeca is typically known for high failure-rates. I'm not sure why this is so. I guess that the leisure industry is largely sensitive to seasonal differences and economic downturns. And perhaps, the barriers to entry are low; there could be a lot of low-skilled entrepreneurs out there, who are not as capable of running & growing a business as they think. And finally, growth in itself could be a problem, if the capital requirements are significant.

The way investors get around it in the Netherlands is actually not to invest. Instead, they leave it up to breweries, who, against a right of exclusivity, lend a certain sum to the business, or give it a discount, and provided it with the necessary materials, branded of course.

What's the problem?
From my angle, there isn't one really. If horeca is such a risky business, and other investors are unwilling to invest, then I don't think an entrepreneur should complain about a simple exclusivity-contract. And particularly so, because of three factors.

For one, exclusivity is only valid if the brewery has less than 30% market-share. In the case of someone like Heineken, who also owns a number of other beer-brands, and has more than 30% market-share, you can quit such a contract after two months. Then again, Heineken does its best to provide other value-added services to make sure that this doesn't happen.

And second, there's a lot of consolidation in the alcohol-business. And just because a company has a certain exclusivity, it may have such a large portfolio of brands that there isn't any shortage of choice for customers; neither do I think these exclusivity-contracts are 100% bullet-proof.

The third factor seems to be a problem. By not giving customers a choice, they have learned not to care about brand so much when they enter a pub. They just ask for a beer. So for them, unless they're a beer-fanatic, it doesn't matter much. For producers, on the other hand, their brand has become a commodity, at least where nightlife is concerned.

Who cares, right?
Heineken seems to care, and is all for the liberalisation of Dutch pubs. Ignoring that a. this would disrupt a pretty good funding situation for Dutch pubs, and b. that Heineken owns more than 30% of the beer-market, making their exclusivity-deals vulnerable anyway, I do kind of see their point.

By turning a brand into a commodity, you take away marketing-potential. If you can position your beer-brand above that of regular beer, then you can reap higher profits. That makes 100% sense to me, from the brewery's perspective.

And, from what I understand, British pubs don't actually have such exclusive deals with breweries. The question is then, how they get funded, or whether the failure rate is perhaps lower in the UK? That, for now, is a question unanswered to me, but I'll do my best to find out.

(You can always give it to me in the comments.)

Part of this topic was inspired by a good article (unfortunately not online) in Dutch Marketing Tribune, still my favourite Dutch mag.

When I started this blog, and my general thoughts about the area of food & retail, it was all about the people. A quality staff and happy customers, what more do you want? And I have to say, from past experiences, that I don't really like businesses that don't place people first.

For instance, one individual I worked with, suggested using handicapped people to put together a product manually. I instantly disliked him. Not that I don't want handicapped people to be productive, but it was the thought behind it; to find a "stupid" workforce, which you can save tons of money on. It was just distasteful.

Another company I worked for was very process-orientated.
There's nothing wrong with that of course, but it was a big company with a reputation for innovation and that is why I joined. And you expect such a company to at least push forward a solid project. Well, as it turned out, the organisation's core-strategy was to start a large number of risky projects and have them compete with each-other. Those that would fail would simply be abandoned, and their staff was expected to fall on their swords… metaphorically. The effect was an incredibly high turn-over of employees, all three projects I worked on no longer exist, and it deeply soured my feelings about this company.

Both these examples, to me, represent a lack of respect for the human element. I realise that business is a hard world, but if projects were designed to be solid in the first place, there would be less of a need for these kinds of practices. Just my 2 cents.

Part 2 - the challenges that people businesses face
HBR (Again! I'm sorry, but I read a lot of HBR-articles!) published an article about people businesses some time ago, which I enjoyed. Following are some notes + thoughts about it.

• People businesses are defined as: "operations which are characterised by 1. high overal employee costs, 2. a high ratio of employee costs to capital costs, and 3. limited spending on activities, such as R&D, aimed at generating future revenue."


• In a top-40 list of people-businesses, published in that same article, only a few qualify as food and/or retail related. These are the Hospital Corporation of America, Tenet Healthcare, Marriott hotels, and Accor hotels.


• For instance, a business like McDonalds does not classify as a people business; it has substantial assets in terms of brand & real-estate, and relatively low people-cost.


• People-businesses face a number of challenges, related to performance measurement, people-management, compensation, and business models.


• Measuring productivity is more important in these businesses, then other economic performance indicators, like return on assets or investment. The challenge is finding the right indicators (employee productivity & profitability), as well as benchmarking it against other companies (employee figures do not always need to be made public).


• To manage people, you need to align employees' interests with business objectives & execution. And you need to find ways to measure performance (see above) continuously and see where your weak spots are.


• Compensation is key, as productivity is very sensitive to it, and is a primary determinant of shareholder risks & returns. Other factors to consider are variability—productivity varies across the workforce and how do you get the most out of a diverse workforce—and reach—sometimes the lowest on the ladder are as, if not more important to a firm's performance, and how do you motivate these people to do their jobs as good as possible?


• There are a number of business models are used in these types of businesses: pricing per hour is a safe method, but does not account for extra performance; a fixed price per output allows companies to shave costs off the inputs and thus increase their profit-margins. It is very susceptible to a high-skilled workforce; a success-fee or commission offers the best returns, but also the greatest risks; some companies use a hybrid of these three.


• The strategic weakness with these types of businesses is that your assets are mobile and can walk out the door. By creating value above and beyond your employees, you can diversify some of that risk away. Of course, you could also try to keep your employees ;).

In other words, I am no longer sure if e.g. a retailer qualifies as a people-business. Looking at other large chains however—Starbucks, Ahold, Ikea—you see that considerable expenditure is geared towards training these people and the secondary conditions—healthcare, etc.—are extensive. But, I guess it depends on the ratio of physical assets & brand vs. employee-value. If the first two far outweigh the second, I guess that makes the difference.

I guess it's up to individual businesses how they want to measure their firm's performance. The most straightforward is certainly return on assets or investment. But even that leads to some question-marks, particularly in today's highly software-based economy, where assets are no longer as necessary, or pricey, as they once were.

For my part, I still think that people are a key-asset to a business, and it's interesting to look at how exactly you motivate a workforce and get the most out of them, as well as how to overcome the challenges related to a people-based business.

Equally interesting is how to align the business-model to match the needs of your assets—the people. Since people are motivated by (financial & non-financial) compensation, do you keep the pay-rate aligned with time-spent; fixed; aligned with performance; or a hybrid of the three? I think the hybrid is always the best choice, but even then some combinations work better than others.

And retaining employees is also an interesting problem; though much less so in countries like France, where getting rid of them is a problem, and differently in places like Silicon Valley, where inter-firm mobility is a key-requirement for many employees. I think the solution is completely personal and cultural, and everybody's answer will be different on this.

The picture is courtesy of prairienet.org

I just discovered a new podcast called "Big Ideas" (iTunes-link), a series of lectures on anything from the impact of urbanisation on musical tastes, to designing menus for restaurants. Oh, and it's Canadian. Not that that's bad, but some parts of the lecture covered local conditions.

John Schneeberger starts his lecture (dated March 1, 2008) off with the basics of menu-design, namely that they should reflect three things:

• What you stand for? Aka. what kind of food do you like to work with?
• What demographics are you targeting? Income, religious issues, etc.
• What are the current trends? And are they for real or just a fad?

Generally, when running a restaurant, you have to understand three things:

• Customer-decisions are always a trade-off between price and quality
• Traditionally, dishes consist of three components: protein, starch, and vegetables.
• What we understand as taste, actually comes from three sources: fat, salt, and sugar.

Any more "avant-garde" food-entrepreneur will have to face these three as a challenge at some point.

Schneeberger discussed three booming trends, vegetarianism, organic food, and local produce, and mentioned a number of challenges related to these.

Vegetarian cooking
The thing to understand about this, is that it's generally cheaper. Schneeberger mentioned a 1:10 ratio when you compare the cost of producing vegetables to the cost of growing a cow. And while it's a booming trend, the industry, somewhat mis-guidedly, still often focusses on trying to replicate the taste of meat, which is impossible (think veggie-burgers, etc.).

Instead, they should be thinking about nutritional value— vegetarian food has been correlated with lower health-problems and is for that reason often recommended by doctors. The problem with these types of diets is of course that they are low in those qualities we would traditionally associate with taste: fat, salt, and sugar.

To create dishes that people actually enjoy, restaurants have to look globally, e.g. Asia, where more exotic vegetable components can bring some needed flavour to these dishes. I think he mentioned seaweed, but also stinky tofu (see pic), which is a type of fermented tofu and one of the few ways to naturally bring flavour to that type of protein.

The implication is that vegetarian food requires a significant amount of specialisation and is often hard to combine with meat-cooking.

Another complication arises from vegan (no dairy, honey, animal-derived products) versus lacto-ovo (incl. dairy, honey, animal-derived) cooking. The first makes it very hard to create a (traditionally) tasty dish. The second, lacto-ovo, allows for more flexibility, through the use of ingredients like eggs, which not only provide extra protein, but also bring a lot of flexibility to the kitchen. You can, for instance, make foam out if it, which would enable the creation of deserts & soups, etc.

Organic cooking
First of all (and I'm not sure if this is just restricted to Canada), an organic food label refers to the production method, not necessarily the quality and taste. Since organic food is more expensive, and taste is not guaranteed, you have to wonder if your clientele is willing to pay extra for that service (remember the trade-off between price & quality!).

The big selling-point here is the information about the product. People like to know how their food was produced; it has a certain value to know that there are no chemicals or genetically modified components in what you are eating. But again, that must be a value that is clearly advertised and which may not be important to every type of demographic.

Local produce
The advantage for the restaurant is that they can form better relationships with their suppliers, it's also cleaner in terms of carbon footprint (less transport), and it also has some marketing value to a certain demographic.

The disadvantage is that supply cannot be guaranteed during all seasons. Schneeberger mentioned something called a "100 mile diet" for instance, but restaurants catering to that need will probably have problems in the winter.

Thoughts
Overall, a pretty insightful lecture of the more exotic (and trendy) type of cooking and its trade-offs.

These types of specialisation are still pretty niche, require significant resources in terms of tools, know-how, and supplier-relations. But, if executed well, a niche can be extremely profitable.

I thought that it was interesting that all the traditional means of cooking, the ingredients and the taste-makers, were pretty incompatible with these newer trends. As such, you are essentially climbing up a hill, trying to educate the mass-market. At the same time, good execution, together with differentiation from the norm, seems like a formula for success.

Just a short tweet.

I'm currently reading a Dutch book on the 2003 crisis at Ahold, but which is actually a historical account of how the corporation came to be. A couple of things I found interesting:

• Ahold actually stands for AH (Albert Heijn) Holdings


• We all know that things are cyclical, but it was interesting to read how a recession and high oil prices were a challenge that Ahold had to face in the 60s-70s, and how they managed to survive.


• In order to inspire Dutch people to shop more, they introduced a financing scheme for fridges, which people couldn't afford at that time. General Motors did a similar thing to help people afford their cars; seems like an interesting way to "upgrade" an economy.


• The fear of a socialist government drove Albert Heijn to look outwards and form Ahold (similar to why IKEA decided to globalise also).


• One of the consequences of politics at that time was the board of directors, meant to provide impartial guidance and represent the workers.


• They made extensive use of consultancies (often McKinsey) whenever they decided on a strategic trajectory.


• One of the directors was a big fan of Harvard Business Review :)


• They use the US as a source of knowledge on how to design their supermarkets. Later on, moving to the US was also seen as a way to increase that learning, as well as a new revenue-source.


• When AH moved to the US, they also brought their own ideas, like, eh, advertising (a terrible, terrible idea).

That's it for now! I'll go into greater detail at a later date.

I took this title from a report on the future of Dutch supermarkets (English pdf). It identifies a number challenges to come, one of which is "stomach share," which is apparently a big deal because of the following three factors:

• Population decline: which translates into less consumers buying food
• Increased longevity: and older people have a lower caloric intake
• Increased awareness of health-issues: which also translates to a lower caloric intake.

The market is shrinking, people are spending less of their income on food, which will have have consequences on the channel (supermarket), the sales concept, and the value chain. And it will affect those players negatively that cannot leverage these four factors for optimum positioning.



What the authors are seeing is that players from the bottom of the market (the discounters) are moving upwards, by broadening their assortment of goods, and players from the top of the market (luxury-stores) are moving downwards, by improving their prices. A number of underlying things are going on here: luxury-stores can become cheaper by improving the efficiency of their stores and sourcing cheaper brands. And discounters can increase their offering through their relationship with suppliers.

Following HBS-quote, from an article entitled "Finding success in the middle of the market", sheds some light how Tesco does it:

A company controls midfield by fielding a complete product line that includes backs and forwards. In its supermarkets, Tesco, the successful UK retailer, offers consumers three options—good, better and best—in most high turnover product categories. In addition, Tesco doesn't just sell groceries through one-size-fits-all supermarkets. Recognizing the need to shape as well as respond to an increasingly segmented market, Tesco reaches its consumers through at least seven different store formats, from convenient Tesco Express outlets at one end of the spectrum to full assortment hypermarkets at the other. But, within all its stores, Tesco implements the same merchandising principles: Better, Simpler, Cheaper.

Can you guess who the loser is yet? Well, according to both the report and much data on the net, the losers are the new, innovative concepts, that may offer certain values to consumers on an ethical or health level, but are not able to reap the same advantages as more established players are.

That is also the answer why so many organic companies are being bought up by fmcg-companies. There's an interesting overview here; but if you want to follow one in real-time, check out this Inc. magazine blog run by Honest Tea, which has recently given away 40% of their company to Coca-Cola.

Of course that is only part of the answer. Consumers are not just focussed on price. And, while consumer-awareness of the global situation and their own health is clearly growing, that's not the whole answer either. People's lives are becoming ever more complex and convenience is a big selling point these days.

It's those companies that can combine a high level of consumer-responsiveness, together with assortment and price, that will capture the hearts of consumers. But I guess what is out, is the solo single-product-serving player in the market, purely focussed on softer advantages like "ethics," and forgetting that consumers still(!) have limited disposable income for their food-expenses, as well a limited time to engage in these activities.

The reasons to love bookstore-cafés is that you get a chance to discover new stuff to read. The reason to hate my particular café is that, every week, even when I ask for a *normal* coffee, the waitress continues to regurgitate the same phrase: "will that be a large of a small?" Anyway…

I read a nice article in the New Yorker today, about a stressed out restaurant-entrepreneur called David Chang, who runs several noodle-bar-styled restaurants in New York City. The Yorker's articles are always so long, but it was a captivating article. I took some notes, which I'll share with you now.

• Waiters make way more money than chefs, simply because of the tips; the figure mentioned was $1700 per 32 hours vs. $350 that chefs make. Turning chefs into waiters, which seems like a logical decision in a noodle-bar, comes with the challenge that these types are not always that domesticated (can't help thinking about Chef! here).


• The front-end of a restaurant—servers(?), the set-up, beverages—is relatively simple (compared to the work that goes into cooking) and can be consolidated across multiple restaurants.


• Personal integrity in cooking—e.g. cutting fish-cakes properly, even though the customer won't notice them in a bowl of ramen—is the difference between a quality-restaurant and a McDonalds or Uno.


• Standards: A piece of chicken can taste wonderful to a customer, he won't know why, but it's actually because it's been prepared (marinated, dried, etc.) for more than 24 hours.


• Quote: "The great thing about fast-food is that you could sell out without worrying about it, because fast-food isn't pretentious and selling out is in the nature of the business."


• Quote: "Cooking is honest work; gives you a way to measure yourself."

Thoughts
The thing about restaurants is that I'm painfully ignorant about so many things going on in that world. Cuisine is like art—it's dynamic and filled with critics. For instance, there's the "foam" trend, mentioned in the article, hot in the 90s, but which I never heard off.

For me, I'm always interested to find out more about this industry, because I want to be part of something that produces culture. But I'm constantly thinking about whether it's wise to enter such an industry without a basic familiarity. It would be like me entering the tech-industry, without being aware of open-source, how to write code, or do project-management; it's just not done.

Food for (mostly, my own) thoughts.

Just read an interview with Ford's ex-CEO Jacques Nasser on the training programs that were prevalent at that time (2000). He justified their need, by outlining the history of the car-industry between 1905 and now.

• 1905-1920s - colonisation of car-companies: smaller replicas of car-factories in the US were being built abroad. Hardly any competition.
• 1920s-1950s - nationalism: lots of countries were building their own national vehicles. Competition mostly on a regional level.
• 1960s-1980s - regionalism: the rise of trading-blocks (NAFTA, EU, etc.) and as a response the functional/regional division of companies.
• 1980+ - globalisation: global competitors, more markets, more divergence of consumers, more need for people/ideas/growth.

The situation at Ford
The result of the last period is that there are more Ford-people around the globe to manage, that more markets need to be served with different needs, and that the company that can generate economies of scale & scope, while being most consumer-orientated wins.

Two strategic priorities are at play here: consumers only see a part of the car, which means that the hidden qualities can be mass-produced; and consumers value those qualities most matched with their environment—e.g. in Brazil, so I read, roads are abysmal (if any Brazilian reads this, correct me), and good suspension is highly valued. In China, luxury models are mostly driven by chauffeurs, while the consumer sits in the back, hence he/she values luxury in that part of the car.

In this scenario, two types of qualities are valued with people: to understand the corporate qualities of Ford and make decisions that favour its mass-market strategies; and those that understand the local environment and can design car-offerings tailored to local needs.

Social operating mechanisms at Ford
Ford, at the time of the interview, had about 12 programs aimed at promoting these skills. The ones mentioned, included: Capstone, which is aimed at (24) executives; Executive partnering, aimed at (12) promising managers; Business leadership initiative, aimed at the whole organisation; and a weekly email-newsletter, called "Let's chat about business," also aimed at the whole organisation.

Methods + Aims were:

• Team-building - to get people to work more closely together / develop a corporate culture
• Teaching - to get people to understand the priorities at a corporate level, rather then just at a divisional/functional level
• Projects - to get people to come up with problems plaguing their organisations at that time and develop creative solutions to them.
• Shadowing - to develop leaders

Thoughts
Several thoughts going through my head at the moment. I am both uncertain how relevant this is to the SME-environment, and at the same time I do a lot of "social engineering" and can certainly think of a few cases in my past where a certain structure would have benefited the small teams I worked in. I'll probably write a third post about the SME-perspective at some point in the future.

My favourite way to picture "social engineering" however, is through designing processes that bring elements of the organisation together with customers and "raw-inputs" (new technologies, future employees, and partners, etc.). Maybe, I'll write about that at some point too.

Of course, I always appreciate the reader's perspective on this. Social programs at an SME-level, good for team-building or bad because it distracts from survival-priorities?

The picture is courtesy of articlescaravan.com

I'm currently reading "What the CEO wants you to know," by Ram Charan, and it's safe to say that it belongs in the top 10 business-books, I've ever read. It's only 140 pages short, but filled with advice that is extremely easy to digest, that I'll be sure to re-read it several times later on, and can warmly recommend to others too.

One chapter in the book struck me particularly, on coaching, as I consider it a vital skill in business-relationships. Although I think Mr. Charan paints a bit of a rosy picture, I consider it a good standard to aim for. Some quotes:

How would you feel if someone gave you positive feedback on the things you're doing well and specific suggestions for building your skills? Chances are you would feel that you had a personal coach, someone who wanted to hep you succeed. You would feel energized. I can tell you from experience that it works. You can do it for those who report to you, and in the process, you will expand your own capacity.
…
Coaching is not a performance review. It's not about what someone did last year, and it's not about money. It's very personal. You're hitting the person between the eyes. You're helping him face his blind sides and learn to do things better. The feedback has to be honest and direct. No sugar coating.
…
Self-confident, secure leaders love to give true feedback because they know that growing people is their responsibility. By true feedback, I mean saying what they really think. Too often, people hesitate because they know they may be wrong, or that they feel reprisal. But chances are your instincts are correct, and they'll improve over time. I've seen numerous times that when you put experienced businesspeople around a table and they talk candidly about an individual, the judgements converge very quickly. It's not had to zero in on the most critical thing the person needs to improve.

Some people say this kind of coaching is a good idea, but their company doesn't have the ambiance for it. Still, you can start with three of four people who would be receptive for it.

The chapter also goes into a number of examples from real life.

Charan's book is all about understanding business principles and setting a limited number of fundamental priorities to improve a business. Coaching is a logical extension to that, as when you clearly communicate what the business priorities should be and how that individual can get there, that's essentially coaching (and makes your life considerably easier in the process).

The author also co-wrote a book called "Execution," which I haven't read, but based on this book, believe is a good choice if you need a more modern read. "What the CEO wants you to know," is from 2000, but I consider it timeless advice.

I'm still "on a break," but stumbled across this interesting titbit from a book on warehousing-practices. If you don't like reading lists, too bad because it's interesting, but I've also summarised the key-points in the end.

China

• Low labour and land-cost, but high equipment costs, translate into large (e.g. 250,000 square feet), low warehouses like in the US, but often lacking even a forklift.
• Certain goods like consumer electronics, are of such high value, have a short life-cycle, and thus a lower inventory-cost, that expenditure in state-of-the-art technology is justified.
• Certain cost-saving practices, like removing the pallets from shipments in order to ship more goods, cause some inefficiencies other countries, like, eh, re-adding pallets.

East Asia

• A traditional focus on personal relationships and less on computational models, means there's a lack of data and opportunities for improving performance are not well-developed.
• The most active economic areas are separated by lots of water, which means lots of product conveyed by air (for high-value or time-sensitive products) or ship (for bulky items or commodities). The high costs associated with this, are incentives to consolidate freight.
• Therefore, more strong regional hubs, like in Hong-Kong and Singapore, are expected to emerge.

Europe

• High labour-costs and an inflexibility of the work force have lead European warehouses to be more advanced in terms of automation.
• A growing common market will also lead to more economies of scale in the future, leading to larger, centralised warehouses.

India

• Characterised by cheap labour and land-cost, but relatively expensive capital costs (machinery and the like) and an underdeveloped infrastructure (both physical & administrative).
• The markets being supplied are generally local and not very wealthy, which leads to the SKUs not being high cost and there being little incentive to increase efficiency through capital expenditure (IT).
• Global demand means that larger distribution centres are being built around large ports like Mumbai (Bombay). The lack of land there is leading to high prices, comparable to Singapore/Hong-Kong.

North America

• Characterised by a culture of mass-consumption and a uniformity of the market and distribution infrastructure, which translates into large centralised warehouses and accelerating rates of product flow.
• Warehouses are often situated in the countryside surrounding metropolitan areas, which is cheaper, while being well-connected.
• A good telecommunications-infrastructure enables better supply-chain co-ordination; Warehouse management systems are generally advanced, and the rich data leads to better tracking and performance.
• High labour-cost are off-set by using cheaper migration-workers

Singapore, Hong Kong, Japan

• Due to a lack of land and high labour-cost, warehouses tend to be built high.
• Elevators are one bottleneck, caused by this style of building, however a Singapore warehouse has found a solution to this: A multi-floor facility with no automation or elevators, but, instead, a spiral truck ramp so that trailers may be docked at any floor (see pic). This does claim more land area, which must be recovered from above, and doesn't work well if trucks have to shuttle between multiple floors.
• While both Singapore and Hong-Kong act as hubs, Singapore is much more international, receiving goods from manufacturers all over Asia and shipping it to other countries; Hong-Kong receives mainly Chinese goods. Also, for the latter, many of the goods come in via trains and trucks, while leaving by ship or flight, while for Singapore it comes and leaves via sea and air.

South and Central America

• Labor costs are low, though not as low as in China, and the nature of its local economy and customers does not justify high equipment expenditure.
• The only exception is Mexico, which can quickly ship products to the US and keep its inventory low, thus justifying state-of-the-art technology.

Final thoughts
Some general conclusions can be drawn.

• Labour costs are a factor when considering automation; automation is a factor when considering optimisation; optimisation is a worthwhile expenditure when dealing with high value goods with a high velocity.
• Cheap land seems a fundamental advantage, looking at the logistical nightmares that Singapore and other high-rise builders must be experiencing.
• Access by land will significantly decrease the cost of transport. Generally, a well-developed infrastructure means more access to wealthy markets and enables warehouses to store high-value/high velocity goods, which is good for them.

The book 'WAREHOUSE & DISTRIBUTION SCIENCE,' which is available as a free download, provides some incredibly detailed info on how to effectively set up warehouses and distribution chains. Well worth a glimpse, if not more.

As some readers may know, I've both read and commented on Malcolm Gladwell's Tipping Point, and found it an interesting book to think about the nature of communities and how certain individuals or groups of them are more influential in passing on ideas than others. That said, while I believe that such "influencers" exist, also from personal experience, I know fairly little about the science of it.

Similarly, Duncan Watts a research scientist at Columbia, working at Yahoo, questioned that principle, asserting that news travels fast, through whatever type of individual. I have no doubt that Yahoo has amassed vast amount of data on what source of del.icio.us bookmarks receive the most clicks, etc., and that the nature of the internet allows even the lowest of the lowest content-provider or -mediator (e.g. yours truly) to lead people to news.

A recent HBR-article gave me some insight into the complexities for companies to measure the value of such referential actions, something they call Customer Referral Value (CRV). It is calculated by estimating the number of successful referrals made by a customer, but differentiating between new customers that came because of his/her referral, and those that would have come anyway. It's a fairly complex formula and requires some extensive market-research, but you can find a good overview in the HBR-article.

This is opposed to a customer's lifetime value (CLV), the traditional way of measuring the value of customers, which looks at the amount that the customer's purchases contribute to the companies operating margin, less the marketing costs to him or her, and projected over a certain period of time.

Using this methodology, the authors of the article measured both the CLV and the CRV of 9,900 customers at a telecom-company and came up with following results:



I added the totals myself, because I thought those would also be interesting. What you can see here is that those with the highest CLV also presented the highest total value to the business, though CRV added considerable value also. What's also interesting is how these are distributed. The high value shoppers added relatively little in referential value, and only in the medium-levels do we see a high amount of CRV.

Through three one-year marketing-campaigns aimed at the high shoppers with low referential value, the medium CLVs with high CRVs, and the low of both, the company tried to stimulate the customers with lower values in either segment to do more, either by spending more or by referring more. The result was a 15.4 return on investment on the marketing-campaign, meaning that for each dollar spent on marketing to customers, $15.4 was gained in revenue.

Clearly, I could say more about how the authors went about it to make these kinds of gains in both CLV and CRV, however that's why this nice article was written about it and I encourage people to check it out if they're interested.

Are there implications for the Gladwell vs. Watts fight? In my opinion, either could be right. What Gladwell has merely done is open our eyes a little towards this whole viral marketing-thing, though certainly some companies were already busy with it. And what Watts is pointing out is that there is great value in building on top of existing networks, something I'm sure the telecom-company benefited from also. The greater lesson here is to look beyond the CLV of a customer, though that already brings a high value to companies, and focus on methods of stimulating word of mouth in innovative ways. How that is achieved depends on the type of business and the networks that it can use to communicate with its customers. Certainly, Milner cheese, which I wrote about a few weeks ago, offers one possible answer. Update: and so does the recent marketing-move by Etsy on Twitter.

This article is mirror-posted on Tech IT Easy.

Premise of this post: Jeremy wrote a nice post today about the boons of starting young and I spent some time this morning advising my sister on writing a business-plan.

A picture says more than a 1000 words

Strategy consists of three components, the financial, the product-market, and the organisational. All are interdependent and when they are in harmony, the chances of success are greatest.

For example, a larger organisation, which is a consequence of a more complicated product-market strategy, will also increase the need for financing, very likely the external kind.

Essentially you have to decide:

• What type of product(s) do you want to launch? What kind of market are you targeting?
• Do you want to be big (less control) or small (more control)?
• Do you feel comfortable with giving away shares of your business to investors?

And some more, regarding what "building materials" you have available or want to use to build your firm. I'll write more about it, when I have more time.

I created the picture myself, but it was inspired by a graph in the book "Entrepreneurial Finance".

UPDATE: After skimming through the book, I did manage to find some more informative chapters on how to structure creative enterprises. So, I'll raise my score of the book to 5/10, and will update when there's more to say.

I was actually not planning to write anything too bookish this week, having championed their status for more than a few days last week. I just want to say that, ever since starting reading TDW, I found myself growing more and more uncomfortable for a few reasons.

First of all, the credo that the book is trying to sell to me is "Dream, believe, dare, do." Yes, I remembered it without checking the book. DBDD is such a simple system, meant to emulate Walt Disney & Co's way of thinking, that pretty much any idiot can remember it.

And that is how I feel like I'm being treated. Like an idiot, who can't remember more than four words.

The book is split up into parts, representing each of the four "magic words." I started on 'Dream,' expecting to find practical story-boarding tips. I'm not yet done, so maybe at the end, but all I've been reading was about companies that the authors consulted, which had "big problems" and now are "a leader in their industry." There is very little, except for between the lines, which I can use as a case-study for me to think that I can replicate this in my own company.

The method most mentioned, is to create a "Dream Resort" (always capitalised, because it's the authors' business). If you go to a Dream Resort, all your creative barriers will fall away, the magic will happen. Believe it! Well, until I see something that justifies spending 1000s of dollars on consultants, or how I can replicate some methods on my own, I don't believe it.

The only instructions I remember reading so far, was a pseudo-sociological experiment with monkeys. Apparently, if you put 99 monkeys on a beach with sandy fruits, one monkey will work out how to wash his fruit in the sea and make it taste better, and eventually the other monkeys will learn from him. And, I paraphrase: "That's how companies learn too." We are all monkeys!

Somewhat ironic, the authors mention several characteristics that people don't like about how big companies are managed, such as arrogance and not including employees in solving problems. I would like to add treating people condescendingly to that list.

The lack of dreams, you could argue, is a big-company problem, which is another incompatibility-issue with some readers like me. There is no creative barrier, really, what is needed is a framework to build a business around it.

Also, small companies are flatter, there are less structural problems preventing the spread of ideas, it is actually a survival mechanism that everyone takes part in steering/fixing the machine that is a start-up.

Anyway, I decided to give this book until the end of the 'Dreams' chapter. If I don't get clear-cut language by then, I'll skim and throw it away.

And I still can't believe that I'm being advertised to buy services in a book that I already bought. An end-of-book brochure is fine, but so far it's very much over the top.

Reviewer's current grade: 3/10 and I'm being generous.

If you follow my blogging-history, you may have noticed that I write about books… a lot! There are several reasons for this. One is certainly that I am a bookworm—I enjoy reading books, learning new things, and whenever I enter a bookstore, I go into a trance and start studying books to buy now or in the future. Case in point: I wasn't planning it, but I bought two more today! Talk about impulse-buy… More on those in a sec…

The other reason is more complicated. I actually think that books translate better to blogging than much of real life. This clearly differs from blogger to blogger. You won't find Robert Scoble blogging about books much, nor Fred Wilson, both of whom blog on more daily issues (Scoble is also a media-guy). Both John Gruber and Jason Kottke do cover books, but often base their writings on articles and other shorter readings.

For myself, it is different and I can give several examples of this. One, I was a pretty regular blogger until about a year and a half ago, when I started on a project of researching venture capital in the Netherlands. Not only was it a time-intensive process, but I was constantly questioning myself as to whether my blogging was ethical or not. There were certain topics reigning in my life, relating to that company, which i could just not disclose. A similar thing happened before that, when I worked at a high-tech start-up, and most recently, while completing my thesis.

There are several blogging friends I could mention (F., J., C., & M.), where you notice this same phenomenon.

Books instead, as well as articles, offer a foundation to build upon. One, they are public, which dismisses any confidentiality issues. Two, if they are well-written, they communicate core-ideas well, and you can add to that with your own knowledge. The complication with reading is of course, similar to writing, finding the time to do so. I think I found a doable system, by reading just before sleep, but I don't know how that will hold up in future projects.

The way I choose books (and articles)
As I look back at my short life, I find that I've evolved in the choices of books I made, and most recently after engaging on this trajectory—the food & retail blog and the underlying purpose that serves. While before, my choice of business-books was somewhat restrained to general management, strategy, and entrepreneurship books, I now choose books purposefully that fill a gap in my knowledge and focussed on business-issues in this industry.

Some examples
I choose the McDonalds (coverage here & here) and Starbucks books (here, here & here), because they seemed like a good venue-point from which to understand how food-businesses work. My interest has always been towards chains of businesses, not individual ones, so that was also a bonus. Similarly, the IKEA-book (here) offered insights into retail, and the eBay-book (here), while less relevant, into starting a business and running a community.

The Disney-book (here), which I'm currently reading, gives me insights into building a framework around the soft discipline of entertainment, story-telling, etc. It is very relevant to my earlier post today on cinemas, which is clearly a raw perspective, but one I hope I can refine, as entertainment is a core-value I have.

The two books, I've chosen today, are on two diverse, yet, to me, relevant subjects. "Managers as mentors" is about what the title suggests. The reason I chose it, is because I'm not a fan of the traditional perception of management. I find it a hard world. The way I relate to people is through learning and teaching. I've raised my brother since I was 11, as my parents were often away from home, and find it very rewarding to see him become an adult. I have a similar relationship towards people, where I like to turn them into more than they imagine themselves to be. So this book seemed right. That is not to say, that I have any problem with firing people that I don't feel have potential. ;-)

The second book is even more interesting to me, it's called "the growth strategies of hotel chains - best business practices by leading companies." It's very strategy-orientated, covering principles of diversification vs. specialisation, vertical/horizontal/diagonal integration, m&a's, franchising vs. ownership, branding & globalisation, and US vs. European differences, as well as examples of said leading chains at the end of each chapter. Exactly up my alley! Needless to say, I will read it after the Disney book!

So what about you?
Now, a discussion is only valuable if more people take part. So please, if you have an opinion on this, or on a better research-methodology for blogs, let me know in the comments!

The picture is courtesy of brandtarot.com

Just some finishing up on the IKEA-book. Following graph describes the structure of IKEA's business, as far as I understand it.

1: Stores - The way the company expands horizontally, is through a tightly controlled franchising system. This both saves costs and minimises international risks.
2: Sales & service - the company is tightly integrates its sales- and service-operations with customers, the latter taking over 80% of the work (and loving it). Huge cost-savings, also benefiting customers.
3: Supply, manufacturing, design - The company is equally well-integrated back up the value chain, with suppliers, manufacturing, and design, and has—since the 90s—been expanding its operations in that direction. Some cost-savings by introducing savings up the logistics-chain, and more flexibility in manufacturing.
4: Management structure - non-public virtual entity that licenses the IKEA brand and is able to offset international tax-differences by being located in Belgium/the Netherlands and changing the terms of licensing-agreement as needed.

You can draw your own conclusions from that, together with what I've written before.

Things that stuck out from the book included:

• Ingvar Kamprad, the founder, who has both a trader's mentality and is at the same time a community-person;


• Sweden, IKEA's country of origin, whose restrictive tax policies actually resulted in pushing the business to become a global company;


• IKEA's cost-philosophy, which is very frugal and part of the company-culture, and also transmitted to the supply side and to customers. Some problems retaining top-employees as wages are not competitive;


• Its franchising-system, which somewhat surprised me, can be explained by the scientific way in which IKEA's operations has been built up. The more rational, the "easier" (a relative term) to replicate. It's also in line with the business's rapid global expansion and its drive to push down costs;


• It's a private company, which makes it less visible and (relatively) less accountable to the public.


• Its vertical integration with suppliers and customers, enabling it to quickly respond to new trends and problems, as well as introduce higher cost-savings than its competition.

All in all, a very interesting company, and actually very similar to eBay in some ways, I think.

P.S. I'll be taking a few days off, to recharge some creative energy.

I'm glad to get this out of my life. It is probably the last bit of procrastination left over from the period spent writing my thesis. Following is a continuation of my coverage of IKEA's growth as a business, which I began, in a wordy fashion, by looking at the Scandinavian years. I decided to shorten that somewhat, as really the book (if you can read it) already does a great job of describing IKEA, though my version is perhaps easier to digest.

1961 - Already when Ingvar Kamprad started trading, he had formed relationships with suppliers from abroad. He employed this strategy also when he launched IKEA, forming relationships with Polish and other Eastern European suppliers, which gave him a drastic price-advantage over his competitors.

1973 ca. - After the incubation-time in Scandinavia, Switzerland was the first country, that IKEA expanded too. Reasons included its neutrality, a healthy economy, low taxes, and a greater entrepreneurial spirit.

1973 ca. - When the Kamprad family left Sweden, they founded several foundations in the Netherlands, Switserland, Panama, and the Dutch Antilles.

1974 onwards - Expansion in Germany, Munich (one of the wealthiest cities in DE). The store was a great success, and Germany is still a pillar of profitability for IKEA today.

1975 - first stores opened in Australia, Honk-kong, and Canada, through franchising. In 1980, IKEA took over the Canada-chains, as those were not being run well.

1978 - First store in the Netherlands. It did not go well at all, due to a lagging marketing-campaign. Only in 1982 onwards did IKEA book successes with the Dutch. 1994 started a huge boom of expansions in the Netherlands (more detail was provided about Dutch branches, because the book was Dutch). Belgium also saw stores after 1978.

1982 - IKEA set up Stichting INGKA Foundation in the Netherlands, which was Kamprad's way of keeping IKEA for IKEA instead of having to give it away after he died. It was in charge of IKEA from then on.

1983-4 - stores in Gran Granaria, Tenerife, and Saudi-Arabia.

1984 - IKEA starts "IKEA Family" loyalty program for customers and also introduces its first luxury furniture product-lines.

1985 - first store in USA and kept expanding. Famously (I read at least 1 case-study about it) there was some teething-trouble at the beginning and it took a while for IKEA to find the correct formula for the US market.

1986 - 60-year old Kamprad steps back as CEO and gives reigns away to 35-year old Anders Moberg.

1989 - the fall of the Berlin wall. The roughly 500 suppliers that IKEA had been working with in the Eastern block, suddenly found their economic situation drastically change and prices started to go up. Out of loyalty, IKEA vowed to pay up to 40% of the price-increases for its Polish partners.

1991 - the Eastern European crisis lead to a strategy-change. IKEA became a producer of furniture. Due to its long-lasting relationship and involvement with suppliers, it possessed the necessary know-how, and becoming a producer would also have positive effects on its flexibility. IKEA could focus on Just-in-Time production to overcome the production-problems it had had in the past. In 1991, it took over a Swedish producer of wood-products, and after the privatisation of the Polish furniture-industry, IKEA took over three companies there in 1992 as well. This became part of a trend and every-time it had the chance, it would take over a supplier in Eastern Europe.

1991 onwards - also saw an IKEA expansion of stores in Eastern-Europe.

1992 - IKEA took over Habitat, a British retailer of furniture, that had previously caused a style-revolution in Britain. Until now, IKEA had not expanded to the UK, and it was assumed that it was Habitat's strength that was keeping it at bay. It was forced to sell, after expanding to France, Germany, and Spain, which had caused it to make huge losses. IKEA also used its presence in those countries as launch-pads, keeping Habitat as a separate brand.

1998 - China! Already having been a supplier of IKEA's since the 70s, and generally believed to be a huge opening market, IKEA opens its first store in Shanghai, through a joint venture with a Chinese firms. It was an exploratory step as the Chinese were not yet economically ready for the type of products the IKEA offered, though the assumption was that China's economy would grow 10% per year. IKEA wasn't competing on price either, basically being more expensive than any local competitor. Only after severe price-drops, did the business take off.

2000 - Russia. The company had already had talks in 1988 to open for business there, however the collapse of the Russian empire delayed that. Finally, based in part on Kamprad's gut-feeling, the decision was made. It was a good one. In year 2, the annual revenue was $260 million, making it one of the most successful expansions ever. 45,000 people applied to 600 vacancies in the first store. Due to high import-taxes of 28%, the decision was also made to start producing furniture locally also.

And everything else… is history.

Note that, as I used a single source for this time-line, a Dutch/German book on IKEA's 11 secrets, this blogpost cannot be taken as an ultimate authority on IKEA's growth-strategies. At the very least, I got some dates wrong.

Final thoughts
In my first post about IKEA's growth, I wanted to make clear that how a business expands is largely related to its origins. The relationship with Eastern-Europe is both due to a cultural proximity with that region, as well as Ingvar Kamprad's drive to lower costs. Germanic countries were also a logical step because of linguistic, and hence cultural similarities, as well as similar economic conditions.

Territories with which it was as yet unfamiliar, were being expanded into in a risk-reducing fashion, through franchising in Canada, China, and Australia, and later on in China, through joint ventures also. The acquisition of Habitat in the UK, could be perceived as a risk-reducing move also.

It is generally recognised that European firms are better at managing international expansion, simply because of the compressed experiences they get from growing in heterogeneous Europe, which makes them more flexible in other countries also. Still, you could see that certain culturally remote countries posed some difficulties, such as the US and China, and even the campaigns in Germany and the Netherlands did not proceed flawlessly.

All that aside, to me the most interesting part of all of this was IKEA's shift in strategy in the 90s, turning from being a retail-outlet to a producer-retailer hybrid. It is both a radical shift, but from what I understand, a very logical one.

That's it. Tomorrow, I'll publish some notes about the biggest pros and cons about IKEA's business.

The picture is a mash-up of the Evolution 101 podcast logo and IKEA's logo.

I've long been interested in the idea of franchising, though I'm somewhat conflicted about how to look at it. One the one side, it seems* like a relatively easy way to start a business, on the other side, it seems* a relatively cheap way to grow your business (*: within limits).

WSJ recently published an excellent study on high-performing franchises in the US. The choice of franchises is extensive, just like I concluded in my post on top-German franchises. At the same time, the most apparent choice, that of food, seems less and less attractive, and I quote from WSJ:

In particular, fast-food and casual-dining businesses, while still showing strength, with eight names on the list, also are facing pressure from wage and food cost increases. To lower operating costs, several food franchises already are shuttering some locations.

Arguably, a business that is thinking about growing through franchising is faced with some restrictions. Writing a franchisees-manual is a scientific process, you'll probably have to restrict the complexity of operations so that they can be replicated, and there will still be some overhead related to managing the brand and some of the more problematic franchisees.

I think that it is that standardisation of operations, made big through the economies of scale so easily achievable in the US, that is bring competitive problems to chains, even to wholly owned ones like Starbucks. If your core-product is simple, and your business uses a simplified operation, then how hard is it for your competitors to replicate your whole business-model and -strategy in the long-term, really? It is only if your business strategy includes complex competitive advantages, such as extensive vertical and horizontal integration across the value chain, and/or if your business-model is based on "high-tech" components or processes, that you have a real chance of beating the clones. And to relate it to the rising operating costs, mentioned above, business with true competitive advantage can raise profit-margins or off-set the costs elsewhere, instead of having to close operations.

But ok, long-term strategic considerations aside, I see franchising is an attractive way to enter the business-world as an entrepreneur. The question of whether it's faux or real entrepreneurship, is not pertinent, I think. Considering that you have a wide range of choice of franchise-business opportunities, you'll still have to work hard to succeed, and the growth-opportunities can include starting multiple franchises also, it is not that different from starting any other kind of business. In my mind, I compare it to internet-entrepreneurship, which also relies on a large amount of free tools and distribution-mechanisms, but is still dependant on that special something for it to be successful.

What makes franchising particularly attractive, is the decreased amount of risk. According to a study in the Netherlands, 65% of franchises are still standing after 3 years. Compare that to independent start-ups, of which only 15% are alive at that time.

A large cause is, I'm sure, the level of support from the parent-company, which differ from business to business, and can include delivery of goods, marketing, administrative and IT services, made cheaper through centralisation. And they are frequently guided through the process of setting up and running the business, including legal advice. In exchange, they give away either a percentage of profits (ranging from 5 to 40%) or a set monthly sum to the franchiser.

The WSJ-article also lists the amount of investment typically needed to start a franchise. It ranges from ca. $5200 for an automotive company, to a staggering $1,3 million for a steakhouse. Of the 25 franchises recorded, only 5 received some kind of financial assistance (none of which in food). Another article at WSJ discusses some of the attitudes towards financing franchises, particularly during the current US-recession. Incidentally, another article in Dutch Elsevier magazine, sees franchising as an excellent way for businesses to grow during a recession, as it requires less human costs.

All in all, it is probably a safer way to start a business, though with all the points I made above, I don't think of it as 'light' entrepreneurship. There's clearly a lot of risk involved, beforehand, in terms of choosing the right franchise with growth-potential, financial risk to fund your business, market-risk, when you launch, and competitive risk, after your up and running.

I still want to discuss this topic further at a future date, particularly focussing on what its like to turn your own business into a franchise, and some other stuff related to buying into one.

The picture is courtesy of friendlyfranchising.com

I'm currently working on a wrap-up of what I wrote about in months 3-6. It's usually a monthly tradition (see months 1 & 2), but this one is extra long and taking me some time. Apologies for the silence this has been causing this week.

One of the things, I'm working on is a work in progress, a map of the food-industry. Step 1 is to identify the individual segments, which, I should note, are probably transferable to a great number of industries. Future iterations will include identifying specific companies in each segment, as well as sub-segments, and specific segment-pains also.

• Segment 1 - the production of raw materials: This can involve anything from growing coffee-beans, to potatoes, to rubber and trees (later used for packaging). Some vertical integration with segment 2 and perhaps 3.


• Segment 2 - the production of consumer-goods: The activities here involve sourcing raw materials and producing them into goods, ready for retail. From my understanding, there are a number of super-producers (Unilever, P&G, etc.) and more specialised ones. Some vertical integration with other segments, plenty of horizontal integration also.


• Segment 3 - retail: A diversified segment, consisting of super-markets, specialised stores, and hybrids (which combine retail with other services like music, etc.). Some vertical integration occurring, with e.g. private labels, and large franchises like McDonalds & Starbucks that communicate directly with segment 1.


• Segment 4 - consumers: too diversified for me to summarise at this stage. What I do note is that the reach of customers is increasing up the value chain: organics, enviromentalism, etc. are all signs of this.


• Sub-segments - marketing & logistics: It has been my observation that the degree that these are externalised depends on the resources available within and the complexities of the tasks. What I also noticed is that it's the supplier, not the buyer, that takes care of these things. And finally, that it's segment 2 that is usually responsible for marketing their products to segment 4, the consumers. I expect that something similar is or will be occurring from segment 1 to segment 4, to address concerns consumers may be having about production-methods.


• Meta-segment A - regulation: It has been my observation from my thesis that the government is a factor at pretty much every stage of the process of bringing a product to the market. It is a tool both for consumers, for larger interest-groups, and for businesses to stimulate change within industries, with all the consequences that has. Again, regulations pertaining to organic & green production-methods, as well as human rights and memberships of trade-unions are just a few of many factors to consider here.


• Meta-segment B - optimisation: This is where I would place consultancies, which are super-specialists aimed at improving processes in and between organisations, but also aiming at customers who are having more and more information at their disposal, more cash, and more complex needs.

That's all for now. Please let me know if I missed anything or if you disagree with something. I am here to learn!

I'm hoping to finish up my wrap-up by this weekend and that it will be business as usual next week.