Sounds + Food 'n' Retail

Take a look at this quote, which I posted a few days ago:

"There should be a rule: before helping the environment in one market, we should be required to think through the impacts on other markets." (source: Freakonomics blog).

Or, to put it differently, every action has a (sometimes equal) reaction (I think the traditional phrasing ignores the human element). The idea that everything is interconnected is both fun to right-brained generalists like me (not a compliment), and scary at the same time. The global economy is very complex and, I would say, impossible to regulate.

There's a couple of things going on the world, which I'm sure everyone is aware of. There's a number of wars, there's the weakened dollar, there's some kind of housing-related recession going on, there's a shortage of oil, our planet is perceived as suffering and currently being saved (I hope), there's India and China, the rise of the Anglo-Saxon system, etc. etc.

And some of the biggest problems facing the food-industry (depending where you are in the chain), are rising food-prices, which relates to that oil-shortage (both in terms of pricing, but also because of alternative fuels using farm-products), the rise of India and China, and some other factors; and the costs of keeping green, which has largely been inspired by companies like Wal-Mart, but also by the (exaggerated) need for global diversity by customers (which the food-industry is also partially to blame for).

The solutions vary, and are, so far, very defensive in their nature. For the cost of going green, most pollution comes from transport and the solution is to either use the most eco-friendly way to go: on land, by train, across water, by ship; or to go local—which companies like Marqt seem to focus on, but which also comes with the pitfall of seasonal shortage.

For rising food-prices, again one solution is to go local, to save on transport and have some control over how farmers work, and be able to charge higher prices to the rising local-conscious consumer. But a bigger solution is for more food-production to happen (much of it currently goes to India & China, or to biofuels), and possibly from smaller farmers. The problem here is that it will take time (some estimate decades) for smaller farmers to get ready.

Both are definitely big picture-problems, and will take time to solve. One thing, I'm personally looking at, are micro-lending sites like Kiva.org, which put you into contact with local farmers, allowing you to help them out in your own way. From a Venture Voice interview with one of the founders, I understand that some of these investments happen within the context of a community, where each member keeps watch over the other's use and repayment of the funds, in order to ensure a good outcome, and so loans will continue to come in. But, while I think it's well worth the effort, this is still a small-picture solution to a much larger problem.

The way it looks right now, the solutions have to be planned in the long-term and on a large scale. There is definitely space in the farming-segment for more production to happen. In the mean time, food-prices will continue rise, as will the price of educating consumers to make more responsible choices. I like Tesco's approach in labelling the origins of their food and allowing people to make more carbon-friendly (locally focussed) decisions. But that doesn't solve the problem for farmers in remote areas of course.

Sigh, if you just got a headache, I sympathise, as I just got one too.

Further reading:

• NYTimes: Environmental Cost of Shipping Groceries Around the World
• Economist: The new face of hunger
• Buzzfeed: Food Hoarding

The picture is courtesy of ABC News.

Last weekend, the Dutch financial Times, FD.nl, had an interesting part-article / part-diary of Henk van der Doelen, owner of a chain of ca. 30 drugstores in the Netherlands. Originally part of a franchise called DA (2nd largest in the Netherlands, afaik), he and several people decided to split because of restrictive conditions. I've followed this story for a while because I'm interested in franchising, and because drugstores are big business in the Netherlands (market-size: ca. €3,5 billion), probably due to its trading history in spices and herbs.

His company, Drogisterij-parfumerie, was founded in 1970, has 270 employees, 29 branches, and an annual revenue of €23 million.

The business also employes a franchise-formula, called 'Pour Vous' (Dutch link), which has existed since 1975 as a soft franchise. It asks a monthly marketing-fee of €250 and / or (this part is unclear) €7000 per year for commercial and marketing-related activities. Total innital investment to join the formula is estimated at €300.000.

I created the colour-coded picture below out of curiosity. How exactly does a retail-chain owner divide his time? Naturally, one week's activity should not be generalised across greater periods or different businesses, and I probably mislabelled some activities. But you can let me know that in the comments. ;-)



What is interesting is that there is a fairly even division of activities, apart from maybe marketing. From the article, I did get the sense that he was more focussed on warehouse-actitivities, also living close to the central warehouse, but he pretty much kept his finger in all the relevant pies for running a business of this sort.

What is also interesting is that he essentially plucked out a number of franchisee-branches out of DA's franchise-network and created his own. In the sense of whether franchising is entrepreneurship or not, I do think that this again confirms that the options remain wide open. This story also sheds a light on what can happen if a franchiser's policies are too restrictive for franchisees.

From my understanding, DA has been making moves towards a more integrated strategy, which did not sit well with many franchisees. Apart from the ca. 30 branches that Drogisterij-parfumerie took with it, another 40 left to join D.I.O. (4% market-share). This still leaves DA fairly strong, with 452 branches and 15% market-share, behind the number 1 in the Dutch market: A.S. Watson (Kruidvat, Trekpleister, and ICI Paris XL) with 877 branches and 40% market-share.

It is time for those links again! This time, we'll be discussing the economics of Apple's physical stores, how Walmart is enforcing RFID, how retailers are trying to trick people to buy more expensive things, how people perceive fun in games, and 10 ultra-geeky home-cinemas.

As usual, my bookmarks can be found here, and the previously covered links, here. Enjoy!

Link 1: Why is Apple saturating (US) cities with retail stores? is a question that Choire Sicha asks on Kottke.org, and lead me to this profit & cost breakdown of Apple's retail stores at Seeking Alpha (see pic below). It does appear it's all about the money, though hard it remains to read Apple's mind 100%. In related news, OObject lists all the items needed to build an Apple store.



Link 2: Is RFID economically feasible? I'm planning to dedicate at least 1-2 posts on RFID on this blog in the future, as I've essentially been following its development since the early coverage on Slashdot. This story on InformationWeek discusses the pressure that Walmart, certainly the biggest champion for RFID in the retail-arena, is putting on its suppliers to finally add RFID into their logistics-chain. As far as I remember, the latter have been complaining about the unfair balance of cost that RFID causes, shifting most of them onto suppliers. I assume, however, that these chips and pallets are reusable.

Link 3: What makes games fun? Lightspeed Venture Partners has an interesting blog, which mostly discusses the business and principles behind digital games. I follow it because games are fun, and if you can understand the source-code of fun, you can replicate it elsewhere. In that spirit, then, it links to an interesting white paper trying to map out what exactly goes on in gamers' heads while playing games. Part 1 is also very much worth a read.

Link 4: A buyer's christmas? The New Yorker digs into consumers' buying behaviour. Interesting is, that people use the net most often to find info, not to buy, but can use that info inside stores (we'll still need ubiquitous internet for it to be shoppers' utopia, however). Equally interesting is, that if a store has two microwaves, consumers will usually buy the cheaper one. With three products, however, they will usually by the mid-priced one. There's still room for trickery, I guess…

Link 5: 10 stunning ultra-geeky home cinemas. In the spirit of my previous post on cinemas & luxury, I thought that this link would be fitting. The Star Trek-themed one is a little too geeky for me, but the Titanic one (no. 6) looks awesome. I'm still doubtful about whether it's about the design or about the movie, but I can't deny that people put a lot of work into designing these.

Just some finishing up on the IKEA-book. Following graph describes the structure of IKEA's business, as far as I understand it.

1: Stores - The way the company expands horizontally, is through a tightly controlled franchising system. This both saves costs and minimises international risks.
2: Sales & service - the company is tightly integrates its sales- and service-operations with customers, the latter taking over 80% of the work (and loving it). Huge cost-savings, also benefiting customers.
3: Supply, manufacturing, design - The company is equally well-integrated back up the value chain, with suppliers, manufacturing, and design, and has—since the 90s—been expanding its operations in that direction. Some cost-savings by introducing savings up the logistics-chain, and more flexibility in manufacturing.
4: Management structure - non-public virtual entity that licenses the IKEA brand and is able to offset international tax-differences by being located in Belgium/the Netherlands and changing the terms of licensing-agreement as needed.

You can draw your own conclusions from that, together with what I've written before.

Things that stuck out from the book included:

• Ingvar Kamprad, the founder, who has both a trader's mentality and is at the same time a community-person;


• Sweden, IKEA's country of origin, whose restrictive tax policies actually resulted in pushing the business to become a global company;


• IKEA's cost-philosophy, which is very frugal and part of the company-culture, and also transmitted to the supply side and to customers. Some problems retaining top-employees as wages are not competitive;


• Its franchising-system, which somewhat surprised me, can be explained by the scientific way in which IKEA's operations has been built up. The more rational, the "easier" (a relative term) to replicate. It's also in line with the business's rapid global expansion and its drive to push down costs;


• It's a private company, which makes it less visible and (relatively) less accountable to the public.


• Its vertical integration with suppliers and customers, enabling it to quickly respond to new trends and problems, as well as introduce higher cost-savings than its competition.

All in all, a very interesting company, and actually very similar to eBay in some ways, I think.

P.S. I'll be taking a few days off, to recharge some creative energy.

I'm glad to get this out of my life. It is probably the last bit of procrastination left over from the period spent writing my thesis. Following is a continuation of my coverage of IKEA's growth as a business, which I began, in a wordy fashion, by looking at the Scandinavian years. I decided to shorten that somewhat, as really the book (if you can read it) already does a great job of describing IKEA, though my version is perhaps easier to digest.

1961 - Already when Ingvar Kamprad started trading, he had formed relationships with suppliers from abroad. He employed this strategy also when he launched IKEA, forming relationships with Polish and other Eastern European suppliers, which gave him a drastic price-advantage over his competitors.

1973 ca. - After the incubation-time in Scandinavia, Switzerland was the first country, that IKEA expanded too. Reasons included its neutrality, a healthy economy, low taxes, and a greater entrepreneurial spirit.

1973 ca. - When the Kamprad family left Sweden, they founded several foundations in the Netherlands, Switserland, Panama, and the Dutch Antilles.

1974 onwards - Expansion in Germany, Munich (one of the wealthiest cities in DE). The store was a great success, and Germany is still a pillar of profitability for IKEA today.

1975 - first stores opened in Australia, Honk-kong, and Canada, through franchising. In 1980, IKEA took over the Canada-chains, as those were not being run well.

1978 - First store in the Netherlands. It did not go well at all, due to a lagging marketing-campaign. Only in 1982 onwards did IKEA book successes with the Dutch. 1994 started a huge boom of expansions in the Netherlands (more detail was provided about Dutch branches, because the book was Dutch). Belgium also saw stores after 1978.

1982 - IKEA set up Stichting INGKA Foundation in the Netherlands, which was Kamprad's way of keeping IKEA for IKEA instead of having to give it away after he died. It was in charge of IKEA from then on.

1983-4 - stores in Gran Granaria, Tenerife, and Saudi-Arabia.

1984 - IKEA starts "IKEA Family" loyalty program for customers and also introduces its first luxury furniture product-lines.

1985 - first store in USA and kept expanding. Famously (I read at least 1 case-study about it) there was some teething-trouble at the beginning and it took a while for IKEA to find the correct formula for the US market.

1986 - 60-year old Kamprad steps back as CEO and gives reigns away to 35-year old Anders Moberg.

1989 - the fall of the Berlin wall. The roughly 500 suppliers that IKEA had been working with in the Eastern block, suddenly found their economic situation drastically change and prices started to go up. Out of loyalty, IKEA vowed to pay up to 40% of the price-increases for its Polish partners.

1991 - the Eastern European crisis lead to a strategy-change. IKEA became a producer of furniture. Due to its long-lasting relationship and involvement with suppliers, it possessed the necessary know-how, and becoming a producer would also have positive effects on its flexibility. IKEA could focus on Just-in-Time production to overcome the production-problems it had had in the past. In 1991, it took over a Swedish producer of wood-products, and after the privatisation of the Polish furniture-industry, IKEA took over three companies there in 1992 as well. This became part of a trend and every-time it had the chance, it would take over a supplier in Eastern Europe.

1991 onwards - also saw an IKEA expansion of stores in Eastern-Europe.

1992 - IKEA took over Habitat, a British retailer of furniture, that had previously caused a style-revolution in Britain. Until now, IKEA had not expanded to the UK, and it was assumed that it was Habitat's strength that was keeping it at bay. It was forced to sell, after expanding to France, Germany, and Spain, which had caused it to make huge losses. IKEA also used its presence in those countries as launch-pads, keeping Habitat as a separate brand.

1998 - China! Already having been a supplier of IKEA's since the 70s, and generally believed to be a huge opening market, IKEA opens its first store in Shanghai, through a joint venture with a Chinese firms. It was an exploratory step as the Chinese were not yet economically ready for the type of products the IKEA offered, though the assumption was that China's economy would grow 10% per year. IKEA wasn't competing on price either, basically being more expensive than any local competitor. Only after severe price-drops, did the business take off.

2000 - Russia. The company had already had talks in 1988 to open for business there, however the collapse of the Russian empire delayed that. Finally, based in part on Kamprad's gut-feeling, the decision was made. It was a good one. In year 2, the annual revenue was $260 million, making it one of the most successful expansions ever. 45,000 people applied to 600 vacancies in the first store. Due to high import-taxes of 28%, the decision was also made to start producing furniture locally also.

And everything else… is history.

Note that, as I used a single source for this time-line, a Dutch/German book on IKEA's 11 secrets, this blogpost cannot be taken as an ultimate authority on IKEA's growth-strategies. At the very least, I got some dates wrong.

Final thoughts
In my first post about IKEA's growth, I wanted to make clear that how a business expands is largely related to its origins. The relationship with Eastern-Europe is both due to a cultural proximity with that region, as well as Ingvar Kamprad's drive to lower costs. Germanic countries were also a logical step because of linguistic, and hence cultural similarities, as well as similar economic conditions.

Territories with which it was as yet unfamiliar, were being expanded into in a risk-reducing fashion, through franchising in Canada, China, and Australia, and later on in China, through joint ventures also. The acquisition of Habitat in the UK, could be perceived as a risk-reducing move also.

It is generally recognised that European firms are better at managing international expansion, simply because of the compressed experiences they get from growing in heterogeneous Europe, which makes them more flexible in other countries also. Still, you could see that certain culturally remote countries posed some difficulties, such as the US and China, and even the campaigns in Germany and the Netherlands did not proceed flawlessly.

All that aside, to me the most interesting part of all of this was IKEA's shift in strategy in the 90s, turning from being a retail-outlet to a producer-retailer hybrid. It is both a radical shift, but from what I understand, a very logical one.

That's it. Tomorrow, I'll publish some notes about the biggest pros and cons about IKEA's business.

The picture is a mash-up of the Evolution 101 podcast logo and IKEA's logo.

I'm a little distracted from blogging, I'm sorry. My current activities include a last-minute scrabble-play of my thesis, to make it a more logical read, and applying for jobs. And, not unsurprisingly, I'm having some writer's block as a result.

My post from a few weeks ago, about my anonymous friend, who's running a lifestyle-orientated business in a developing market, certainly opened my eyes to this area of the market.

Today, I'll talk about another company, Milner (cheese). There was an interesting article in Dutch marketing-magazine, Tijdschrift voor Marketing, on Milner's positioning-strategy from mass to lifestyle, which I'll discuss now, and which also lead to a post on Tech IT Easy about social networks as a strategic marketing-tool.

Milner = FMCG
Milner is considered a FMCG-company, that's fast-moving consumer goods, and falls into segment 2 on my food-industry map from last week. As I observed there also, this segment is usually the driver, if not always the conductor, of consumer-marketing.

The company is currently strongly present within the health-segment for cheese in the Netherlands, with over 50% market-share. This segment is also seeing between 60-70% growth from cheeses in general.

One thing that is clear for FMCGs is that margins are generally low (generally under 10%), competition is high, and as I made clear in my post on Tech IT Easy, features can easily be emulated by other companies.

Generating complex competitive advantages
The differentiating factor is the relationship the brand has with the consumer and vice versa. A brand that is designed for a lifestyle will generally have a much higher emotional value to consumers, than one based on features like cost or taste alone.

The logical conclusion is that those companies with deeper relationships to their customers will enjoy a higher competitive advantages over companies that do not focus on these relationships. And the complex nature of relationship is one that is difficult to emulate, hence giving companies a sustainable lead in the market.

But how to do that?

Paradigm-shift towards lifestyle
A lifestyle-product can be defined as a product that is built around the context of a certain group of consumers, resulting in an emotional value, as well as one based on features. This also has implications on the product-marketing strategies that a lifestyle-orientated company undertakes. As you may remember, the company my friend operates, still spends a considerable amount on marketing-activities after 2 years.

The theory that Milner cheese employs goes as follows. A great pain for food is health—which is really just an after-effect of the lifestyle people are leading. People are constantly looking for answers, so-called lifehacks, or more diet and exercise-related advice, all to regain power over their lives, minds, and bodies.

The key-issue is how to reach these customers. By addressing the pain that customers are feeling, by helping them live a healthier life, Milner is engaging in a relationship with its customers.

How does it do that?

How the internet fits into this
Traditionally, internet-marketing expenditure for FMCGs is quite low, around the 2% mark. Milner's budget currently assigns 10-15% to internet-marketing. It is able to do so, because it is already relatively well-positioned in terms of its brand and communication, so it feels more confident to experiment with new mediums.

As mentioned in my post on the food-industry-map, marketing to consumers is the responsibility of the consumer-goods-segment, however the degree that this activity is outsourced, depends on the amount of resources available to the company and the level of complexity of the activity. Arguably, both the novelty of internet-marketing to Milner, and particularly engaging into a relationship with consumers, make marketing fairly complex affair and the company did this via a third party, Advance, an interactive marking agency.

Advance set up a site called Je Beste Dag (translated: your best day), which advises visitors on how to have better days, based on a questionnaire they fill out. The first stage of the strategy is to build up a large mass of consumers that give out their email-adresses for further advice. Currently, there's 1 million people connected to the site. The second stage is to deepen that relationship, by encouraging return-visits and ultimately start a conversation.

It's both a time- and cost-consuming process for Milner. Essentially it is the sole sponsor of the campaign and has been running this campaign for nearly half a year no, without seeing any types of new product-developments yet. It is however working together with (other) marketing-agencies to develop its brands, which includes the design, positioning, quality, etc., as well as new product developments.

The interesting part of the whole process is that the majority of visitors already knows Milner, before even visiting the site. In other words, this clearly is an interactive marketing-campaign, which deepens the relationship between company and customer beyond the brand. Also, while the segment that Milner markets to via traditional channels, usually falls in the age-groups of 40-60, the age-group it is reaching now falls between 25-45, 60% of which don't yet have children.

Final thoughts
It is uncertain what exactly will come out of this. Milner is treating their internet-campaign as just another marketing-channel and holding Advance to targets it must meet. Which also allows them to measure its effectiveness. However, with a million young people connected to the site, and the communication-channels open, my gut tells me that they will be pretty happy.

The conversational aspects that the internet provides are certainly no surprise to the regular internet-user, however many web-companies are finding it difficult to generate sustainable business-models (e.g. Twitter / Facebook). As I made clear in my post on Tech IT Easy, I think these kinds of marketing-campaigns open up some possibilities there.

I'm currently working on a wrap-up of what I wrote about in months 3-6. It's usually a monthly tradition (see months 1 & 2), but this one is extra long and taking me some time. Apologies for the silence this has been causing this week.

One of the things, I'm working on is a work in progress, a map of the food-industry. Step 1 is to identify the individual segments, which, I should note, are probably transferable to a great number of industries. Future iterations will include identifying specific companies in each segment, as well as sub-segments, and specific segment-pains also.

• Segment 1 - the production of raw materials: This can involve anything from growing coffee-beans, to potatoes, to rubber and trees (later used for packaging). Some vertical integration with segment 2 and perhaps 3.


• Segment 2 - the production of consumer-goods: The activities here involve sourcing raw materials and producing them into goods, ready for retail. From my understanding, there are a number of super-producers (Unilever, P&G, etc.) and more specialised ones. Some vertical integration with other segments, plenty of horizontal integration also.


• Segment 3 - retail: A diversified segment, consisting of super-markets, specialised stores, and hybrids (which combine retail with other services like music, etc.). Some vertical integration occurring, with e.g. private labels, and large franchises like McDonalds & Starbucks that communicate directly with segment 1.


• Segment 4 - consumers: too diversified for me to summarise at this stage. What I do note is that the reach of customers is increasing up the value chain: organics, enviromentalism, etc. are all signs of this.


• Sub-segments - marketing & logistics: It has been my observation that the degree that these are externalised depends on the resources available within and the complexities of the tasks. What I also noticed is that it's the supplier, not the buyer, that takes care of these things. And finally, that it's segment 2 that is usually responsible for marketing their products to segment 4, the consumers. I expect that something similar is or will be occurring from segment 1 to segment 4, to address concerns consumers may be having about production-methods.


• Meta-segment A - regulation: It has been my observation from my thesis that the government is a factor at pretty much every stage of the process of bringing a product to the market. It is a tool both for consumers, for larger interest-groups, and for businesses to stimulate change within industries, with all the consequences that has. Again, regulations pertaining to organic & green production-methods, as well as human rights and memberships of trade-unions are just a few of many factors to consider here.


• Meta-segment B - optimisation: This is where I would place consultancies, which are super-specialists aimed at improving processes in and between organisations, but also aiming at customers who are having more and more information at their disposal, more cash, and more complex needs.

That's all for now. Please let me know if I missed anything or if you disagree with something. I am here to learn!

I'm hoping to finish up my wrap-up by this weekend and that it will be business as usual next week.

If you read further into the ACNielsen-report (pdf), I wrote about two days ago, you'll have seen that retailers' private label-strategy seems to be focussed on certain key-areas, namely:

• General health


• Weight-loss


• Organics / Fair Trade


• and Food for kids

Looking at all of these, none of them are the type of product you would usually associate with a low-price strategy. The type of customer that buys these products will likely be more conscious of the quality of ingredients, which would push the price of manufacturing up.

At the same time, there are lot of savings on the marketing side for private labels. Retailers are in fact huge market research factories—every move that a customer makes in their store, with their products, can be entered into a database and used for future marketing strategies.

And having full control over shelf-space, shelf-placement, and in-store marketing means that the budget for these can be minimised.

All of which has three implications:

• That more of the budget can be allocated to the quality of private label products.


• That it pays off to have an elaborate in-store-system to collect consumer-data.


• And that independent product-manufacturers are perhaps screwed.

Looking back at the data on consumer behaviour, I also found it striking that there is very little difference between income-levels, size of households, and age, in relation to private label-consumption. It would suggest, and is confirmed by the data I presented last time, that the offering for private labels is actually broad—there's something in it for everyone.


Figure 1: Private label share of spend segmented by income level (source: ACNielsen, 2005)

Of course, this doesn't mean that independent product-manufacturers are completely screwed. It puts pressure on them to become more innovative with their products and marketing than they ever were before. Which is the right kind of pressure.

Final thoughts
There's not much not to like about private labels. In many ways it's a more efficient system. Less time and money needs to be spent on the marketing-side, and more can spent on the back-end—the production. At the same time, independent manufacturers will have the advantage of flexibility. They can (perhaps) adapt quicker to market-trends, or perhaps even lead them.

Not all market-research needs to happen in the store either, some also needs to happen where the consumption happens—at home or elsewhere. And large independent manufacturers perhaps have a better foothold on general trends in society, than retailers, who are mostly restricted to what happens in their store.

(On a related note, one of my early posts on this blog discussed P&G's strategy towards shopper-marketing, worth checking out!)

So it's perhaps not a black-and-white situation. But I think that, looking at Starbucks, which is essentially a private label, that this strategy has considerable merit, because it gives retailers a lot of power over the quality of these products and how these are sold. It essentially shifts the brand up towards the retailer, instead of it remaining on the product-level.

More on this as I come across it.

Essentially private labels, also sometimes called house brands, are products branded either with the name of the retailer, or, at times, sharing some kind of umbrella-name, decided by the distributor or otherwise. But what private labels really represent, to me, is the ultimate example of a power-struggle between a retailer and suppliers. Sometimes, but not always, it also means that some kind of vertical integration has been taking place between retailers and manufacturers, or, at the very least, packaging plants.

For now, I'll just be looking at some stats on private labels. At a later date, I'll take a look at more supplier-retailers dynamics, branding strategies, etc.

Geographic share
According to an ACNielsen report (pdf), the global* market-share for private brands was 17% in 2005 (* global meaning 38 countries and 80 categories), and had grown 6% that year.


Figure 1: Share & growth rates of private label by region (based on value sales) (source: ACNielsen, 2005)

Europe has the largest market-share with 23%, and Latin America the smallest, with 2%. Top countries included Switzerland, with 45%, Germany, with 30%, and the UK, with 28%. The largest Private Label growth happened, unsurprisingly, in emerging markets (11%) like Croatia (77%), Greece (24%), and Thailand (18%).

One big growth-contributor in Europe is the strong growth of hard discounters, such as Aldi or Lidl (both German chains), who are present in every European country and expanding rapidly. With Aldi, for instance, private labels make up 95% of sales.

Private label foods
Category-wise, refrigerated foods have the largest overall share of private labels, namely 32%. Complete ready meals take the lead here, with an average of 47% private label-share. In the UK, 97% of ready-meal sales are in fact private label.

Another significant private label food, or rather drink, was milk, of which private labels make up 43% of sales.


Figure 2: Value shares of private label by category (source: ACNielsen, 2005)

Other high private label food-products include frozen meat (39%), fish (39%), and vegetables (38%), and 37% for shelved vegetables. Frozen pizza is at number 27, with 17%, tea and coffee at numbers 37 and 38, with 14% and 13% respectively. Wine is at number 44, with 12%. And Beer is all the way at the bottom, at number 74 with 3% !

Among the fastest growing foods are drinking yoghurt (28% growth), baby food (20%), chocolate (13%), and water (13%).

Pricing trends
One of the strengths of private labels is of course that they are cheaper, on average 31% less than manufacturer brands. Emerging markets showed the biggest discount, with PL-goods costing 41% less on average. Europe wasn't lagging in this respect either, with an average price difference of -37%. On a country level, Greece, Australia, and Germany were taking the lead with, respectively, -48%, -47%, and -46% discounts (compared to manufacturer brands).


Figure 3: Price differential of private label by category (source: ACNielsen, 2005)

Again, concentrating on food-categories, the products that received the biggest discounts were Sports Energy Drinks (-55%), carbonated beverages (-43%), cereals (-40%), wine (-38%), and tea (-37%). Food-categories taking the least in discounts, included chewing gum (+7%), wet soup (no difference), meat (-2%), and ready meals (-5% <- I guess that explains their high market-share). 

Final thoughts
That market share is increasing more quickly in emerging countries is not surprising. Retailers there will likely not be mature and/or consolidated enough to focus on such a strategy, but this is clearly changing.

Germany's dominance is also interesting, as both Aldi and Lidl originate from there. One of my next posts will be on Ikea's European growth and Germany's also very strong there, which suggests a certain preference for low prices with German customers.

Switzerland is still somewhat of an enigma, but I'll try to find out more about it.

In terms of products, both the dominance of private labels amongst ready-made meals, and that their prices are quite similar to regular brands, is very interesting. It could suggest that customers either don't care much for quality and brand-differentiation in that sector, or that private label brands are actually quite good. The price-level would suggest the latter conclusion.

Generally speaking, refrigerated goods are different in the eyes of consumers, I think, less scrutinised perhaps, and worthy of more investigation. Milk is of course similar to water, and hence not really a product where brand makes a huge difference.

What else? Certain beverages, like coffee, wine, and beer are quite interesting, as their private label share is quite low. This would suggest a high brand-sensitivity in these sectors. The low percentage for beer (3%) is certainly striking.

More on private labels as I come to it.

I suck up data wherever I go (it's a curse, I know). Just last week, as I was waiting for my laptop-drive to be installed, I sat in a German bank and came across a magazine, called VR-future. Two articles caught my eye, one on the Bio*-boom in Germany, and another on Switzerland—a country that fascinates me, but that's a story for another day. 

The bio-trend article consisted of an interview with Dr. Alexander Gerber, the Germany CEO of the BÖLW (the foundation for organic products in Germany) and revealed some interesting info on this segment. While it focussed entirely on Germany, I do think it brings some interesting insights on this topic in general. (*: "bio" being the German term for organic)

Now, I should say, that I'm generally weary of the word "Boom," as I inadvertedly associate it with the word "Bust." Any market is subject to the laws of supply and demand, and a boom usually suggest an explosion of one or both, eventually leading to some fall-off after a while. I have no doubt that the same will happen to the Bio-sphere as well. There are also particularities about the organic market which I do not like, and I will go into those in my final thoughts.

The rest of this post is structured as follows. I will begin with the definition of organic, then some stats on sales, after which I will look at employment-trends, and expected areas for growth. I'll conclude with some final thoughts, to answer why I am bearish on this whole organic trend.

So, what is "bio" or organic?
From Wikipedia:

For crops, it means they were grown without the use of conventional pesticides, artificial fertilizers, human waste, or sewage sludge, and that they were processed without ionizing radiation or food additives. For animals, it means they were reared without the routine use of antibiotics and without the use of growth hormones. In most countries, organic produce must not be genetically modified.

Bio-Sales
Worldwide, while the percentage is low (Wikipedia reports 1-2% of food), it is showing far quicker growth than conventional food. In the US, Wikipedia reports a 17-20% annual growth of organic food in the last few years before 2004(!), compared to 2-3% for regular food. 2.6% of food sold there is organic. In Europe, while I don't have the stats on exact growth-rates, the percentage of of agricultural land being used to grow organic produce, is on average 3.9%, with Austria (11%) and Italy (8.4%) leading the pack.

In Germany, the annual revenue from bio-products with discounters and supermarkets has more than doubled since 2000, up to € 4,6 billion in 2006. And, at the moment (2007), Bio-products have a 3% share of sales in small food-stores, which is expected to double by 2010. The level of food-prices, held low by government subsidies, is expected to rise in the future, which… will probably not mean much to the bottom-line of retailers and producers. And, apart from the ethical considerations, bio in Germany has very much become a lifestyle product, translating into lower price-sensitivity. According to Gerber also, a new bio-supermarket opens every week.

With all this positivity, there is the somewhat counter-intuitive trend that farmers in Germany are complaining about falling incomes, and annual growth in their area has slowed down from 20% in 2000 to 0,4% in 2006. I imagine that is so because the market is maturing and because large buyers are pushing the prices down. A similar trend is being reported in the documentary, The Future of Food. Gerber also mentioned that there is a lacklustre support from the German government and the European Union in terms of subsidies.

Employment-trends
In general, the organic sector is a pretty people-intensive industry. While I don't have global stats, in Germany, about 160.000 people are involved in creating, processing, and selling bio-wares. In the last 7 years, the employment in bio-related sectors has doubled, especially in processing and sales.

On the farming-side of things, a third more people are employed than in traditional farming. And there is a need for people in production, processing, and sales, especially in the last two areas. In addition to this, the bio-sphere is very consulting-intensive, meaning there's also a need for highly trained personnel.

With is all this need for people, the German education-system does not yet offer truly specialised courses in this area. There is a program, however, co-sponsored by the BÖLW, the government, and the companies involved, which offers training for practitioners interested in working in the organic industry. Generally however, "learning by doing" is encouraged in this field, which, incidentally, also explains the high number of consultants.

Growth-trends
Gerber sees three areas for growth: Small cities, food-venues, and apparel/cosmetics. Regarding the first, Bio-supermarkets and -shops are starting to be set up in German cities with less than 50.000 people. And there are many of those in Germany.

He also expects growth in food venues, both fast and traditional, who currently receive around 25% of food-related spending, in which bio is still only taking up a very small percentage. Finally, Gerber also expects a larger bio-component in textiles and cosmetics, though I have no stats on how important that industry is.

Some final thoughts
The organic value-chain seems to be organised in a fairly similar fashion to the traditional way of producing, processing, and selling farm-goods. Some points of note are the way that bio-products are produced, the accountability-aspects, and the educational ones.

For the first, the natural way of producing these products will require some serious adaptation by producers and distributors. And since information is such an important component to bio-products, and by now a legal requirement, it will also require producers, distributors, retailers, and marketeers to set up new procedures for extracting and exchanging information. Finally, the fact that this is a fairly new market and official training-courses seem as yet to be lacking, there is a need for educating both businesses and consumers.

All of this translates into higher costs of production, which is reflected in higher prices for consumers (Wikipedia reports this to be 10 - 40% more than with conventional products). It is only a good thing that the end-products have lifestyle and ethical value, meaning that customers will be less price-sensitive about them. But will this be enough in the long-term?

In general, farming is already highly dependant on government-subsidies, which is already a bad sign for bio-produce as that seems even less efficient. And the increased demand for goods like wheat and dairy-products, from countries like India and China, means that there is actually a need for more, rather than less efficiency in farming.

Also, the current boom in food-education seems one that is limited. Eventually, the market for information will mature, customers will know all they need to know, and will be looking at other differentiators, most likely price. Large retailers, who are able to keep prices down when needed, are better-positioned for this, versus the more specialised shops who seem to be purely focussed on lifestyle, and hence high prices. Eventually, as the market becomes mature, I expect there to be a fall-out for both smaller bio-shops and in the area of consultants and niche-marketeers.

All in all, while I'm no expert on organic produce, and while I am fairly optimistic about demand continuing to rise, I'm not sure if there are still big profits to be made on the supply-side, even though there seems to be explosive growth in that area.

That said, I'm not bearish on all things organic. Bio-food in food-venues like restaurants and similar is very intriguing and, I think, will fit very well into this environment, where fresh food and good food is a strong differentiator. I'll have to collect more data on this, but I'll definitely write something on business in this area in the future.

The picture is courtesy of Petdiscounters.com and was chosen purely for effect.

HBS Working Knowledge, in an article on lean principles in services industries, lists the four principles that the Toyota Production System is based on:

Rule 1: All work shall be highly specified as to content, sequence, timing, and outcome.
Rule 2: Every customer-supplier connection must be direct, and there must be an unambiguous yes or no way to send requests and receive responses.
Rule 3: The pathway for every product and service must be simple and direct.
Rule 4: Any improvement must be made in accordance with the scientific method, under the guidance of a teacher, at the lowest possible level in the organization.

I love stuff that saves me reading a whole book, but would this work in a food / retail environment? I can't say 100%, but I can hypothesise.

Let's take a restaurant or coffee-shop. The way I see the information-flow is in the shape of a funnel, which is wide on both ends and quite narrow in the middle.


(If the words are unclear, it's, from left to right, a. customers, b. information, d. goods, and b. production (though the last should be c.))

Essentially:

1. customers have a ton of choice when they order
2. they narrow down this choice to their selected items
3. pass it onto the waiter
4. who passes it onto a kitchen
5. where another wide selection of ingredients is narrowed down
6. and the end-product is produced
7. which is again delivered to the customer.

And let's take a look at how this would work if the rules were applied.

Rule 1 - Specification of content, sequence, timing, and outcome?
Content is the stuff on the menu, which can be set to a limited number of choices, matching the availability of ingredients in the kitchen. Sequence are points a to d on the picture. Timing is an unwritten agreement between the customers and the food-place that their order will be delivered as quickly as possible. Outcome will be the satisfied customer (who will pay for his order).

Rule 2 - A direct customer-supplier connection / yes or no communication?
Again, this should be possible, by making the menu as transparent as possible and the kitchen organised to produce pre-specified combinations quickly. As for the direct connection, there are several ways this could be happening. A low-tech way would be a number associated with an item on the menu. Little miscommunication can happen on the way to the kitchen. One high-tech way being used right now is electronic notepads, which communicate with the kitchen or bar. I'm not a fan of it, because I think it erects a barrier (of slowness) between the customer and the waiter, but ok, it's a somewhat direct link. Another way could be to simply give the customer an electronic menu. It works online, why couldn't it work on a food-venue environment? The customer presses some buttons, the kitchen gets the order, the waiter delivers or the customer picks it up. Simple (but probably expensive).

Rule 3 - Simple / direct pathway for every product or service?
I'm a little confused by how this differs from rule 2, so I'll probably have to pick up the book after all… damn.

Rule 4 - Bottom-up scientifically co-ordinated improvements?
The key to successful growth is writing a manual / formula that can be reproduced over and over. If you can capture the components of quality that distinguish your venues from competitors, you can take over the world. What this rule means to me is that with a manual should come expertise, and this expertise should be used to train people from the lowest level upwards. The lowest level in the restaurant-scenario is the customer or the customer-interface. Placing experts in that vicinity, ensures a good bottom-up approach and improvements that are targeted at improving the customer-experience. This will also provide quick feedback about what could be wrong in other parts of the supply-chain, e.g. the communication, the timing, the quality of the food/drinks, etc.

Final thoughts
Now, of course, I won't pretend that these four rules are a replacement for me learning more about lean operations. I'll definitely be picking up The Toyota Way, to grasp the more subtle nuances. This was simply an exercise to see if lean principles can be applied to other—non-car—areas. I think they can. At the same time I don't think that leanness is necessarily an excuse for frugality either. It simplifies operations to focus on other areas instead, like e.g. improve the end-product quality for customers.

The five-forces model, as developed by Micheal E. Porter, illustrates the biggest factors that may enter into the strategic decision-making process. These are, on a vertical level, suppliers and customers, on a horizontal level, competition from products, new entrants (can also be vertical), and rivals.

To explain the horizontal/vertical, often when you talk of horizontal, you mean companies and products that are on the same level as you, competing for the attention of the same customers (and suppliers). Vertical relationships are those which a company depends on, either their relationship with suppliers or their relationship with customers. Each of these also operates on their own horizontal axis. The more powerful players on that level become, the more they can affect players on the other levels.

There are different levels of importance per force, depending on the context and type of the firm. When a company is more powerful horizontally, a market-leader, even a monopolist, it does not have to worry about suppliers as much, and is perhaps able, financially, to integrate vertically, taking over some of its suppliers and/or some of the middle-men that stand between the company and its customers. Vertical integration can be important when you want to control the supply chain for some reason, e.g. to increase the level of quality of your products. It can also become important if competition on your horizontal axis is threatening or may become so in the future.

3 examples
You can see this play out in a number of retail-situations. Apple, which is strictly focussed on design and marketing, outsources the manufacturing of most of its products, but is fairly vertically orientated towards the customer-side, doing most of its business in its retail-locations and online stores. Because of this concentration of power in the middle and proximity to the customer, it also has more power over its suppliers, able to make strong demands, and it's also better equipped to compete with horizontal players like HP or Sony, who are not as vertically integrated towards the consumer. The added benefit of a close customer-presence is also that you can use this as an opportunity to create customer-focussed products, something a lot of non-verticallly integrated players are not so good at.

Another fascinating company is Amazon, who spotted an opportunity to surpass brick & mortar stores, by becoming a distributor with a web-based store-front. Traditionally, the book-industry was organised as follows. A book gets printed, it then gets distributed, it then lands in a store, and then the customer buys it. Amazon integrated three of these functions: distribution, store, and customers (four, if you include ebooks into the formula). The end-result was that the customer became empowered: he could review books, even sell books second-hand. Which disempowered other stores where this was not possible, and publishers, who were before able to simply push out best-sellers downstream. Publishers are still powerful of course, essentially acting as a gatekeeper to writers, but this will change as soon as online publishing can be consumed comfortably.

A final example is Ikea, which is surprisingly similar to Amazon. It also started as a distributor, back in the day when a store-front was a newspaper-advert and phone-line. Ikea saved money, by working closely together with manufacturers in Poland, even building and buying machinery for them. The end-result were standardised designs, at low costs, and produced on a massive scale. It became close to the customer, by using its warehouses as store-fronts, and enabling customers to buy via catalogue and later via the web-site. Its competition was the traditional furniture store, conservative and producing designs that were both expensive and focussed on exclusivity (which translates to small-scale production). Because of this perceived strength, they were arrogant enough to not worry so much about prices on the vertical axis, both from their suppliers and for their customers. All of which could be exploited by some frugal and out-of-the-box thinking (a combo which fits surprisingly well together).

These are all three examples of durable goods. If you get into food however, even restaurants, the formula changes. But that is a story for another day.

Be a thief
Isn't 5-forces fun? I think so. So what can we learn from this? For one, that it's important to consider strategy on multiple axes. How will a business deal with its suppliers, its customers, its competition?

Also, it is actually a weakness to be too vertically or horizontally integrated, as that creates a certain arrogance and/or passivity towards how you deal with these parties. New entrants will eventually come, and probably on a different axis all-together. Being too integrated, means that the business has many dependancies, which will make it all that more slower to react to changes.

What I think always pays off, is to be close to customers. By constantly adjusting your strategy, so that the value proposition for customers is increased and personalised for them, you ensure a certain loyalty (which gives you time to change) and you can sense it sooner when their attention drifts towards other types of products.

A final thought. Business is very much an art-form and in art there is one great saying: "Good artists copy, great artist steal." The copying refers to that everything has been done to a degree. People have sold computers, books, furniture, and those products are clearly fulfilling a demand, which, for now, continues to exist. Where people can innovate is in creating new combinations of things. In other words, if you copy a competitor's business-model, you gain only the part of the market that does not already get served by the existing business-model.

If instead you steal the good parts from other business models, and create your own combinations of these good things, you can create greater value-propositions for customers than already exist. This applies just as much to combinations of five forces, as it does for anything else.

A few weeks ago, I wrote a little about how small leisure-businesses deal with ecological issues, and how that is sometimes stimulated by government-subsidies. In my ignorance, I saw this mostly as a marketing-issue, though an article by Michael Porter and Forest Reinhardt in the October-issue of HBR, made me look at it a little differently. In it, Porter and Reinhardt propose a strategic look at climate issues, both inside-out—pertaining to the company's activities—and outside-in—assessing how external factors can affect the business.

Inside-out
By looking at activities along the value chain of a business—meaning all the activities that affect the final value to the customer—and calculating eco-costs per activity, the company can evaluate what activities cost in terms of total emissions and make a decision as how to deal with them. Note, that both in a strategic and a marketing-sense, both direct and indirect costs are relevant.

Assuming that emission costs are a certain expense in the future, looking at a value chain in this way can have severe consequences on seemingly innovative activities, like just-in-time supply chain management, which is quite transportation-intensive; e-commerce, which often depends on small shipments; and offshoring, which can severely lengthen transportation-routes.

Some examples of how to deal with emissions inside out are:

• Using tools within the enterprise, like Toyota's life-truck, that is designed all around for reduced cost to the environment.
• exchange information with your partners regarding gas emissions, reduction targets, and other climate-change targets.
• Have your own procedures in place to evaluate not only your own emissions, but also those of your suppliers' products coming in and those of your end-products, when used by your customers. This also involves visiting your partners' production-facilities, forming collaborative emission-reducing strategies, and understanding how your customers use and dispose of your end-products.
• Creating an incentive structure with your partners, which involves carbon credit-trading and other rewards for their good behaviour.
• Similarly, set up information-exchange policies on a departmental and business-unit-level regarding emissions and reduction-strategies, and implement a reward-system.
• When on land, using rail-road transportation instead of road, as that is far more efficient in terms of emissions.
• Evaluate your activities, and focus on optimising the high-value ones and either eliminating the low-value ones or outsourcing them to more efficient companies.
• Jeremy Fain, at Tech IT Easy, also proposes some measures on how to implement IT-related cost-reductions

Ultimately, the company that can be most innovative in its emission-reducing process, can gain significant cost-advantages over those that are lagging in this respect.

Outside-in
According to the article, there are two external threats to businesses: that of actual climate-change and how that will affect regions that may be important to a firm's bottom-line; and regulations imposed by governments, which may impose costs on certain activities. Both are very hard to deal with.

Obviously, for the latter—the regulations—the best way is to implement as many "inside-out" savings as possible. In addition, it is important to work closely with watchdog-agencies and institutions to be compatible with most recent trends, as well as be prepared for what may come.

For the first—safeguarding against climate-change—only companies that can either keep their supply-chains flexible enough to deal with regional changes, or those that can invest in scientific "cures" for climate-changes, such as drought-resisting crop, can have some sort of advantage in this regard.

Final thoughts
The scientific community is fairly aligned in their perception of the problem. And for the business-world, Porter and Reinhardt see this as a revolutionising force, equalling or outweighing globalisation and information technology.

A lot of business are still receiving mixed messages from the political, scientific, business, and consumer-community. But what is certain is that legislation will continue to become more strict in this regard. So from a cost-perspective, it certainly is a wise choice to implement emission-reducing measures as early and as wide-spread as possible.

Similarly, as I wrote in my last post, there is a public-relations angle. Customers are becoming much more aware of environmental factors, and may prefer to shop at places which respect this reality.

The picture is courtesy of firstnationalpower.com.

I stumbled across this through an IBM white paper on consumer trends. The "Well Curve" is a term, coined by Daniel Pink at Wired Magazine, describing an inverted bell-shape, where people are expressing preferences in either affordable mass-products on one side of the spectrum, and on the other side, demand for luxury products which possess emotional qualities to the consumer. The companies that fall in between suffer from a lack of identity and demand. This phenomenon can also be observed in politics and the way organisations structure themselves.



This demand-curve is stimulated by a number of trends, made clear in the white paper. On the demand-side you can see that:

• Customers have access to virtually an unlimited* amount of information
• Customer values are fragmented and drive fragmentation in markets
• Customers become more guarded about how their privacy / personal data is used*, which requires changing marketing strategies

(* This is true to the degree that information is understandable/trusworthy/accessible; ** I think there are cultural differences there, and this is targeted at US-sentiments.)

And on the supply-side, you can see that:

• Megaretailers are "expanding across geographies, formats and product/service categories, blurring market segments and devouring market share."
• Companies are forming flexible “value networks,” which offer more value to consumers are hard to replicate.

I personally recognise the trend, but at the same time find it's quite simplistic, as perhaps its predecessor, the Bell Curve, was. Instead of assuming that consumers are a collection of mindless drones who want similar things, it now assumes that consumers are slightly less mindless and want two similar things: acceptable quality at low prices, and emotional quality at high prices.

What about emotional quality at emotional prices (my emotions definitely prefer low prices)? While this sounds like a joke, I'm completely serious about it. The reason why marketeers don't like emotions, is because they seem very hard to measure. Instead, replace the word by 'individualistic.' Individualistic quality at individualistic pricing. The curve, which right now is 2-dimensional, would then have to be shifted to represent a number of overlaying curves, sort of like waves in an ocean, representing all the individual demand-curves that are possible. I suppose, I could coin it the "Wave curve."

To an extent, you can see this being played out in some business models that have come forward in online music. Radiohead just released their latest album "In Rainbows," at a price which downloaders can decide. Similarly, the Freakonomics-blog describes the phenomenon, as they do in their book, in regards to bagels.

Of course, this can also be viewed as one part of a greater selling-strategy. "In Rainbows" may be selling online at emotional prices, but at lower-than-cd quality. At the same time, Radiohead are also selling cds, which are claimed to contain extra content, as well as selling out at concerts (a true example of emotional value at high prices). So not much has changed there.

An alternative model would the auction-method, though I think that this only works if there is a restricted supply, made possible with rare goods or airplane-seats, but not so much goods that can easily be mass-produced.

It's hard to predict whether a wave-type curve would work as a viable revenue-model, but what is clear is that when you give consumers a real choice, they will choose more than one or two variables, instead maybe ten or twenty. And I suppose that the next best solution for that is simply the free market.

It's a fair question. Look at the picture on the right. This should be a familiar view in just about any city: a long queue for a tall latte. The picture suggests several things. One, that coffee seems to be a popular product; two, that there is space for more coffee-shops; or three, that this particular coffee-shop should perhaps improve its service.

The truth is that this trend is scary for many an existing coffee-shop owner. Because the café, in Europe, has been around for quite some time, centuries for all I know. Yet if you walk just down the street from where I took that picture at a Rotterdam coffee-shop, you'll see a line of traditional cafes, spacious and atmospheric, yet entirely empty. The fact that people would line up at this particular coffee-shop—the only Starbucks-like venue in Rotterdam—suggests that they don't care about space, about atmosphere. All they are about is convenience (if you call waiting for 5 mins. a convenience); coffee-to-go; and exotically-named and expensive coffee. What is happening here is not so much the comoditisation of coffee itself, rather the comoditisation (read: non-importance) of the coffee-selling venue.

I'm not sure if people would care whether they bought a coffee at McDonalds or the Metropole-cafe in Brussels anymore, to be honest. If the selling point is how quickly you can get the coffee and get out, what does it matter if the venue is a palace, ready to serve its customers on its hands and knees?

There are plenty of stories about "how Starbucks drove me out of business" (here's a borderline case), strangely outweighed by stories about "how Starbucks saved my life" (here's one). And with McDonalds increasingly getting ready to become a competitor to Starbucks, and other venues, like Leonidas, a Belgian chocolatier, transforming their previous chocolate-laced focus into a coffee-one, I don't think it's unnatural to be afraid. If a coffee-venue is a commodity, then how hard is it to change your existing venue? Insert some coffee-pumping machines, put a to-go sign on your door, and you're set.

So what should an entrepreneur do? Leave or fight? Yesterday's odd post about Beef, of all things, did suggest another way of looking at business: on a system-level. What was essential to the Chinese beef industry, to meet demand? Proximity to the market, amongst other factors. And what is essential to the coffee-industry? Probably not more coffee-venues, but maybe something else.

When you look at the way the coffee-industry is structured, and probably most industries, it's like a funnel: there are a number of coffee-producers (not sure how many), and a definitely greater number of coffee-venues. The latter is battling for the attention of customers. They do so by engaging in new business development opportunities, both internally (e.g. music), and externally (e.g. coffee in cans). They need to open more and more locations to maintain their air of convenience, just look at the picture above. They need to brand themselves as the number one place to go, versus all the 100s of other new and traditional venues. They need properly trained staff. They need good coffee, and other quick food-products, etc.

This would suggest following openings*:

• marketing consultants
• new business developers
• new business providers
• real-estate agents
• customer service consultants
• coffee-buyers
• temp-agencies
• quick food producers, e.g. a bakers
• and I don't know what else.

(* disclaimer: none of the above can be taken as sensible business advice, without conducting your own study)

The point is that, while a certain, most obvious, business opportunity is shrinking, doesn't mean that there isn't a need for more business. As a (creative) entrepreneur, you just have to look outside the coffee-cup (read: box) and see if customers and coffee-venues would not be in need of other services. And perhaps I am wrong, and because it is so easy to implement a "to-go" formula, it is actually easy to start some kind of food-related venue and add the coffee on top.

Anyway, all this coffee-talk is making me thirsty for one myself.

A few weeks ago, it was announced that the world's dairy prices (and anything related to that) will rise by a few percentage points. The reason being that the demand for dairy-products, most often in the form of milk-powder goods, is soaring in China.

But it's not only milk that's hot in demand, another cow-related trend is making the rounds. Surprisingly (or perhaps not), this trend was started by McDonalds-restaurants, who have been in China since 1990. And while traditionally, the use of beef was sparingly reserved for stir-fry dishes, the Mac in McDonalds has caused a drastic taste-change towards more beef-orientated dishes.

Beef-importers would be all excited, if it wasn't for one little snag: the mad cow disease, which lead to at least a few countries being banned as beef-importers to China, including the US. This certainly can't have been comfortable for them, considering they exported around $3.19 billion worth of beef in 2003, which fell to $605 million in 2004 (after the ban), and, only in 2006, did it pass the $1 billion mark to $1.63 billion.

Time Magazine writes about how Western Cattle Company found an interesting method to get around the ban, by breeding the cows in China itself. In other words, they are exporting their know-how to Chinese farmgrounds, in the city of Hohhot, China's dairy capital, which houses two of China's biggest dairy companies, Mengniu and Yili, as well as around a million cows. The Western Cattle Company is not importing cows, it buys them, fattens them up, and its off to the slaughterhouse.

The company plays both a smart and risky game. With China's beef-consumption up 31% since 2006 alone (source: USDA), and US-imports being banned, it firmly implants itself as the leading US beef-producer in China. At the same time, several similarly-aimed joint ventures have failed in the past and a large reason is both the risk of competitors and the lack of a good supporting infrastructure. As for the first, China, as with most of Asia, clearly has a reputation for being quick on the uptake and even quicker to copy. And with a lacking standard-setting authority in China, consumers will find it hard to judge whether beef comes from an authentic source or a local competitor.

Still, beef-businesses are hopeful, that as demand soars, so must complex and hard to replicate mass-production-methods. With large quantities of beef being produced comes a new problem however, that of guaranteeing the safety of the environment. Even if the cows are kept safe, there is no guarantee that the water or air is pollution-free, and that the corn being fed to cows is clear of pesticides.

Clearly, setting up shop in China does not only depend on being there quickly, but also on being able to produce mass-quanities of goods to meet the staggering demand, doing so in a fashion which makes it hard to replicate by the locals, and implementing a lobbying campaign focussed on improving the infrastructure around your production-facility. The last of which will be a nightmare for many, I'm sure.

In this regular segment I focus on news of note (to me at least), about brands that I'm familiar with. I may someday write about Nordstrom, Costco, and Walmart, whom I hear great things about in terms of service, supply-chain management, and frugality, but until I come in contact with what they sell, I'm not sure I can say much. That said, I'm aware that Walmart made moves into Germany (and failed, which intrigues me), and has taken over at least one chains (Asda) in the UK as well, which I have visited. So never say never.

Coca-Cola and Nestlé
Coca-Cola has, for a third time, partnered up with Nestlé, this time to develop coffee and tea-products. The previous times, the company worked Nestlé to develop Enviga, a calory-burning drink; and with L'Oréal, a daughter-company of Nestlé, to develop the beauty-drink Lumae. So reports Dutch Marketing Tribune.

A few months ago on Tech IT Easy, I expressed my wonderment at the Coke Zero brand and what their aim was there, as well as held a rant on how un-innovative "junk"-drink (or -food) brands are in general. I think this is an interesting move. It won't make the world a better place, perhaps, but it'll be more colourful.

Similarly, I know that Starbucks formed a partnership with PepsiCo a few years back, to develop canned coffee-drinks, also to be sold in supermarkets. So this could very well be a competitive move, by either Nestlé and/or Coca-Cola to compete with a perceived threat of Pepsico's or Starbucks reach into customers' taste-buds. Update: Looks like MSNBC reported on a similar story last year.

Leonidas expands to the cafe-arena
In other, coffee-related news, Belgian chocolate-manufacturer and retailer Leonidas is opening a coffee-outlet in the Netherlands, a first step of what it calls a worldwide expansion of its products and outlets. This according to Dutch publisher, Elsevier.

Again similarities can be drawn with Starbucks (sorry, SB-haters), which started as a producer and retailer of coffee-beans, before it expanded into the business of coffee-bars as well. I think what both Leonidas and Starbucks have in common is a reputation of offering fine products as well as offering a third place which customers feel comfortable in. It's a relatively easy step-up for Leonidas, if its experiment were to succeed, because it can simply adapt its existing retail-outlets.

Isn't the world of coffee exciting?

Last Sunday, I finally got around to watching the F8 Facebook developers-keynote, which was released in May this year (Thanks Jeremy). Similarly, this morning I got to read the transcript of Mark Zuckerberg's, the CEO of Facebook, keynote and Q&A on the Techcrunch40 event. Both made quite an impression to me, enough, I'm sure, to warrant a discussion (not started by me) on Tech IT Easy, I hope.

During F8, Mark presented Facebook as combination of three consideration for developers:

• Deep Integration
• Mass Distribution
• New Opportunity

Ignoring the marketing-speak and the fact that Facebook is a software, there are many parallels to be found in successful retailing.

Deep Integration: Mark speaks of code, I speak of the source-code that a retail-outlet is made of, it's internal design, stock, packaging, marketing, etc. If you want to optimise the situation for both you and non-store brands, you should find a way to deeply integrate their products into your assortment, and adapt your marketing and design accordingly. There are subtle strategic considerations why this may not always be happening, mainly related to maintaining a power-balance between retailers and suppliers, but that is a conversation for another day.

Mass Distribution: This is based on both the number of visitors your store has and the number of outlets spread regionally, nationally, or worldwide. The more eyeballs you can offer third parties, the more attractive your store becomes to their presence.

New Opportunity: Mark speaks about revenue, offering application-developers the ability to integrate their own advertising and transaction-possibilities and to collect 100% of those returns. This would be very un-characteristic for "real-world" retailers, I would imagine. For one, their cost-structure is very different from Facebook. Renting out space to applications on Facebook is fairly cost-free, ignoring bandwidth, and would cost some real dollars in the real world.

In the software-world, there is the interesting concept of an API, an application programming interface. Facebook released one for its developers, and while they have the full freedom (within norms) to develop applications, there is still an underlying framework of how to build it and in what fashion to present it to users.

I'm just hypothesising, but this would be one way of integrating similar philosophies into food and retail places. Think about the way values are passed down to subsidiaries or franchises. By bringing a business to a level that much can be rationalised into training- and franchisee-manuals, you can apply similar thinking to 3rd-party's in-store activities.

One such example, at least it seemed that way, is a Naked Chef stand, which I came across in a Dutch department-store the other day.



As you can see on the picture above (I hope), the stand is located in the middle of the kitchen-section of the store. It features a combination of books by the naked chef, wines and other ingredients, and on the back, high quality cooking-utensils.

This is the kind of partnership that does well, I think, selling products from both parties in a symbiotic fashion.

The other big online retail-platform is of course eBay, and since I read The Perfect Store, perhaps I'll write more on that in the future.

I feel like I've written enough about Apple over the last months on Tech IT Easy, and similarly the blog-space is a-buzz with the news of iPods, new colours, new ways to get media, blablabla, how boring huh?

Well, while I still want an iPhone, especially now that it's dropped to a price where the synergy between media-player, mobile PC, and phone is actually quite compelling, I was much more interested to hear the news about yet another partnership, this time with Starbucks. If you aren't a faithful reader of Tech IT Easy, you may not have noticed that lately I spent a lot of time discussing food-related things (completely unrelated to tech of course) and in particular, several posts about Starbucks. The first was on how Starbucks uses vertical integration to maintain a high level of quality throughout their value chain (it is not a franchise!), and the second, more tech after-all, on the concept of a third place and how the web fit into this.

The third place
I hopefully do not need to go into this again too much, as much of the definition can be found on my post and on Wikipedia. But essentially a third place is the space between home-life and work-life, where we try to find some time for ourselves.

Starbucks has really been pushing this concept, both in their amazing book, and of course in their stores. I should mention that, as a European, I'm quite spoiled as far as third places / food-related leisure venues go, and Starbucks, in my opinion, could use some... personality, for lack of a better word. But that is mainly the legacy of scale economies, which is king in the US, and lead to the global and uniform-looking  chains, like McDonalds (see my other post on that here), that we are used to seeing, of which Europe, in turn, has very little to offer.

How has Starbucks tried to make their venues third-place worthy? Well it starts with creating a place where people like to be. Initially, Starbucks was a coffee-bean retailer, not selling coffee-drinks, and a big credo at that time, and ever since then, was to educate people about coffee. This is based on two vital ingredients: excellent coffee and a staff both qualified and approachable. And education and customer-service are pretty much the core of Starbucks, as I see it.

Second is creating an atmosphere that makes people feel at home. Here, music plays an important part as well as providing places where people can work and browse the internet. This has manifested itself in several partnership, with music-producers and artists, incl. Apple, as well as T-mobile to provide fairly global internet-coverage in their chains.

The latest is of course Apple's announcement that people will be able to buy songs currently playing in a Starbucks at a finger-click through itunes, and at no internet-charge.

Starbucks the retailer
After reading the book "Pour your heart into it," I've always seen Starbucks as much more than a simple coffee-chain. The company is aggressively forming partnerships to offer customers a richer experience in their stores, and expanding their reach into supermarkets as well, in order to gain mind-share. And, as Schultz announced in the Apple Keynote, the company is still in its embryonic stages, which I can easily believe.

Focussing purely on their retail-outlets for now (and not their innovative shifts into people's homes), that is what their coffee-houses are in fact becoming. Building on the reputation of their coffee, Starbucks has been extending that to other products in their stores as well, always using the credo of "quality first." While, similar to Apple, this quality comes at a premium, Starbucks is playing into current market -trends that quality leads to less price-sensitive customers, and as long as the company keeps doing well, it can keep charging these prices.

What I see is a shift from the supermarket, book- or music-stores, to places where people come first of all to relax and second to surround themselves in a type of glamour, listen to good music and buy it, read a good book and buy it, have a great coffee and buy some beans to take home.

This is only made possible because Starbucks has a strong control over their value chain and a lot of marketing power at its disposal. A regular coffee-chain, which does not own its own coffee-factories, nor have the financial capacity to own multiple stores, instead franchising them, does not have the same negotiating strength with partners to guarantee this level of quality.

While Starbucks did not entirely start from the ground up—Howard Schultz actually acquired the bean-maker after a while and took their name, it clearly pays off to start as high as possible on the value-chain, as a manufacturer, while having a keen eye for what customers want.